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   ABSTRACT	  
	  
In	  smart	  grid,	  the	  scale	  of	  pole	  devices	  that	  monitor	  the	  health	  of	  power	  line	  is	  large.	  With	  the	  upgrade	  
of	  smart	  grid,	  the	  number	  of	  these	  resource-­‐constrained	  (in	  terms	  of	  memory	  and	  computation)	  devices	  
is	  further	  increasing.	  These	  devices	  are	  easy	  targets	  to	  security	  attacks	  as	  they	  are	  accessible	  via	  wireless	  
network,	   and	   use	   weak	   passwords	   for	   authentication	   and	   transferring	   telemetric	   data	   to	   the	   pole	  
maintenance	  personnel.	  General-­‐purpose	  security	  protocols	  are	  not	  suitable	  for	  providing	  data	  security	  
to	   these	   devices	   with	   limited	   memory,	   computational	   power	   and	   network	   connectivity.	   Therefore,	  
security	  in	  smart	  grid	  is	  still	  a	  challenge.	  
In	   the	   first	   part	   of	   this	   thesis,	   we	   present	   a	   SCalable	   and	   Automated	   PAssword-­‐CHanging	   protocol,	  
SCAPACH,	  for	  unique	  authentication	  of	  human	  personnel	  (operator)	  and	  secure	  collection	  of	  telemetric	  
data	  from	  a	  large	  number	  of	  measurement	  devices.	  SCAPACH	  employs	  physical	  per-­‐operator,	  per-­‐pole-­‐
device	  information	  as	  well	  as	  changeable	  secret	  salts	  to	  generate	  new	  unique	  passwords	  and	  secret	  keys	  
every	  time	  a	  pole	  device	  is	  accessed.	  In	  this	  work,	  we	  address	  the	  memory	  and	  computational	  constraint	  
problem	   of	   measurement	   devices.	   Besides,	   we	   address	   the	   limited	   change	   management	   capability	  
problem	   of	   the	   measurement	   devices	   and	   our	   protocol	   works	   for	   evolving	   infrastructure.	   Our	  
experiments	   confirm	   that	   the	   password-­‐changing	   protocol	   authenticates	   and	   transmits	  measurement	  
device	  data	  securely	  and	  in	  real-­‐time	  under	  varying	  maintenance	  scenarios.	  	  	  
In	   the	   second	  part	  of	   this	   thesis,	  we	  describe	  a	   secure	  and	   lightweight	   scalable	   security	  protocol	   that	  
allows	  a	  power	   system	  operator	   to	   collect	  data	   from	  measurement	  devices	  using	  data	   collectors.	   The	  
security	   protocol	   trades	   off	   between	   computations	   and	   device	   memory	   requirements	   and	   provides	  
flexible	  association	  between	  data	  collectors	  and	  measurement	  devices.	  These	  features	  allow	  data	  to	  be	  
securely	   transferred	   from	  measurement	   devices	   to	   power	   operator	   via	  mobile	   or	   untrustworthy	   data	  
collectors.	  We	  analyze	   the	  complexity	  and	  security	  of	   the	  protocol	  and	  validate	   its	  performance	  using	  
experiments.	  Our	  results	  confirm	  that	  the	  protocol	  collects	  data	  in	  a	  secure,	  fast	  and	  efficient	  manner.	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  1.1	  Motivation	  
Current	  power	  grid	  systems	  and	  their	  power	  lines	  in	  the	  field	  are	  monitored	  by	  telemetric	  measurement	  
devices,	  which	  are	  sensors	  with	  capacitor	  banks.	  These	  devices	  are	  placed	  on	  top	  of	  electric	  poles.	  These	  
devices	   usually	  measure	   telemetric	  measurements	   like	   frequency,	   voltage,	   and	   current	   readings	   from	  
power	   lines	   and	   store	   them	   locally.	   Utility	   companies	   collect	   data	   readings	   from	   these	  measurement	  
devices	   on	   a	   regular	   basis	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   health	   of	   power	   line	   is	   sound	   and	   stable.	   The	   proper	  
operation	  of	  the	  power	  grid	  relies	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  data	  collected	  from	  this	  large	  number	  of	  sensors	  and	  
measurement	  devices.	  The	  data	  collection	  needs	  to	  be	  efficient	  and	  secure	  in	  order	  for	  smart	  grids	  to	  be	  
economical	   and	   dependable.	   For	   example,	   these	   data	   are	   critical	   when	   damages	   occur	   due	   to	   any	  
disaster.	  The	  utility	  company	  needs	   to	   identify	   the	   faulty	   location	  by	   frequently	  analyzing	   the	  unusual	  
data	  readings	  taken	  from	  these	  measurement	  devices.	  	  
In	   our	   hierarchical	   data	   collection	   model,	   human	   operator	   carrying	   data	   collector	   devices	   are	  
responsible	   for	   collecting	   data	   from	   the	  measurement	   devices.	   The	   data	   collector	   devices	   report	   the	  
data	   readings	   back	   to	   the	   utility	   company	   to	   ensure	   better	   situational	   awareness;	   where	   situational	  
awareness	   is	   the	   ability	   to	   know	  what	   is	   happening	   on	   the	   grid	   and	   to	   anticipate	   future	   problems	   in	  
order	  to	  take	  effective	  actions	  [36].	  
The	  motivation	  of	  the	  thesis	  includes:	  	  
Scalability:	  Power	  grid	  system	  uses	  a	  large	  number	  of	  measurement	  devices.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
the	   number	   of	   data	   collector	   devices	  may	   vary	   from	   small	   to	   large	   number	   according	   to	   the	  
requirement	   of	   a	   particular	   utility	   company.	   Therefore,	   the	   data	   collection	   framework	   should	  




Flexibility:	   The	   data	   collection	   framework	   should	   provide	   flexible	   association	   between	  
measurement	   devices	   and	   data	   collector	   devices.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   utility	   should	   have	   the	  
flexibility	  to	  assign	  different	  data	  collector	  devices	  to	  collect	  data	  from	  the	  same	  measurement	  
device	   at	   different	   times.	   This	   feature	   is	   particularly	   important	   in	   scenarios	   where	   the	   data	  
collector	   devices	   are	   mobile	   or	   the	   infrastructure	   is	   evolving	   so	   that	   different	   mappings	   or	  
assignments	   between	   the	   data	   collector	   devices	   and	   measurement	   devices	   can	   be	   used	   at	  
different	  times	  after	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  measurement	  devices.	  	  
Security:	   Currently	   security	   of	   data	   inside	   the	   measurement	   devices	   and	   the	   data	   collector	  
devices	   is	   an	   important	   concern.	   Data	   inside	   the	   measurement	   devices	   and	   data	   collector	  
devices	   are	   easy	   target	   to	   security	   attacks	   due	   to	   the	   wireless	   channel	   over	   which	   data	   is	  
transmitted,	  and	  also	  due	   to	   the	  weak	  passwords	  and	  vulnerable	  authentication	  protocol	   that	  
utilities	   use	   to	   access	   theses	   devices.	   The	   security	   threats	   are	   further	   increasing	   with	   the	  
increased	   scale	   of	   these	   small	   resource-­‐constrained	   devices	   due	   to	   continual	   security	   reviews	  
and	   cryptanalysis	   advancements	   [2].	   Measurement	   devices	   are	   typically	   secured	   by	   simple	  
passwords,	   known	   to	   many	   users	   (maintenance	   personnel	   or	   operators),	   with	   the	   same	  
password	   often	   used	   for	   a	   large	   number	   of	   devices.	   Besides,	   telemetric	   measurements	   are	  
transmitted	  over	  wireless	   channel	   by	   encrypting	  with	   the	   same	   symmetric	   key	   stored	   in	   both	  
devices	  in	  every	  communication.	  The	  password	  used	  by	  human	  operator	  and	  the	  keys	  used	  for	  
encryption	  should	  be	  changed	  periodically.	  	  
The	  framework	  should	  maintain	  the	  confidentiality	  and	   integrity	  of	  the	  data	  readings.	   In	  other	  
words,	   the	  data	  reported	  by	  the	  measurement	  devices	  to	  the	  utility	  should	  remain	  secret	  to	  a	  
potential	   eavesdropper	   and	   an	   active	   attacker.	   In	   addition,	   some	   systems	   require	   the	   data	  
collector	  device	  to	  perform	  an	  integrity	  check	  right	  after	  it	  receives	  the	  message	  containing	  the	  
data	  from	  the	  measurement	  device,	  even	  though	  it	  may	  not	  decrypt	  the	  message	  to	  retrieve	  the	  
raw	   data.	   This	   enables	   a	   trustworthy	   data	   collector	   to	   immediately	   detect	   potential	   data	  
corruption	   and/or	   tampering,	   so	   that	   a	   remedial	   action	   can	   be	   taken.	   Without	   this	   feature,	  
corrupted	   and/or	   tampered	   data	   cannot	   be	   detected	   until	   delivered	   to	   the	   utility.	   The	   utility	  
should	  also	  be	  able	  to	  tell	  whether	  the	  data	  have	  been	  tampered	  with.	  In	  some	  systems	  it	  is	  also	  
required	   that	   the	   data	   to	   remain	   confidential	   to	   a	   compromised	   data	   collector	   device.	   This	  
allows	   the	   utility	   company	   to	   outsource	   the	   data	   collection	   procedure	   without	   sacrificing	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security.	   In	   the	   event	   that	   the	   data	   collector	   needs	   to	   aggregate	   the	   data,	   homomorphic	  
encryption	  can	  be	  used	  to	  maintain	  data	  confidentiality.	  	  
Resource-­‐limitation:	   The	   measurement	   devices	   limited	   storage	   and	   computational	   capacity.	  
Therefore,	   the	   data	   collection	   framework	   needs	   to	   be	   computationally	   lightweight	   for	   the	  
measurement	  devices,	  i.e.,	  the	  framework	  should	  require	  the	  measurement	  devices	  to	  perform	  
very	  few	  expensive	  cryptographic	  operations	  and	  to	  send	  few	  messages	  over	  wireless	  network.	  	  
Therefore,	   the	   development	   of	   a	   robust,	   scalable	   password-­‐changing	   and	   data	   collection	   protocol	  
framework	  is	  imperative	  to	  ensure	  secure	  device	  authentication	  and	  secure	  delivery	  of	  data	  within	  real-­‐
world	  constraints.	  
	  1.2	  Problem	  Description	  and	  Contribution	  
In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  (i)	  authentication	  of	  human	  operator	  and	  data	  
collector	  device	  and	  (ii)	  data	  collection	  by	  data	  collector	  device	  from	  measurement	  devices.	  In	  the	  first	  
part	   we	   assume	   that	   the	   data	   collector	   devices	   are	   trustworthy	   and	   are	   allowed	   to	   read	   the	   data	  
reported	  by	  the	  measurement	  devices.	  In	  addition,	  we	  assume	  that	  data	  collector	  devices	  report	  data	  to	  
the	  control	  center	  when	  they	  are	  within	  the	  control	  center’s	  security	  perimeter.	  
We	   propose	   a	   fast,	   cost-­‐effective,	   scalable,	   and	   robust	   password-­‐changing	   protocol	   framework,	  
SCAPACH,	  which	  generates	  new	  device	  passwords	  to	  be	  used	  for	  authentication	  between	  data	  collector	  
and	  measurement	  devices,	  and	  symmetric	  keys	  to	  be	  used	  for	  secure	  data	  communication.	  To	  the	  best	  
of	  our	  knowledge,	  this	  is	  the	  very	  first	  attempt	  to	  address	  our	  goals.	  We	  introduce	  Physical	  Unclonable	  
Functions	  (PUFs)	  to	  alleviate	  the	  load	  of	  measurement	  devices	   in	  generating	  and	  keeping	  keys	  without	  
revealing	   them.	   It	   lessens	   the	   memory	   and	   computational	   burden	   from	   measurement	   devices.	  
Moreover,	   our	   SCAPACH	  protocol	   generates	   device	   passwords	   and	   symmetric	   keys	   based	   on	   physical	  
information	  (such	  as	  local	  time,	  pole	  geographical	  location,	  data	  collector	  device	  id	  etc.)	  and	  changeable	  
stored	  secret.	  Hence,	  they	  are	  short-­‐lived.	  We	  ensure	  that	  -­‐	  
i. different	  device	  passwords	  and	  symmetric	  keys	  are	  generated	   inexpensively,	  and	  used	  
every	   time	   an	   operator	   accesses	   a	   measurement	   device	   using	   his/her	   data	   collector	  
device	  and	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ii. data	  are	  transmitted	  in	  a	  secure	  and	  real-­‐time	  manner.	  	  
To	  validate	  its	  performance	  we	  implemented	  the	  SCAPACH	  protocol.	  Our	  experiments	  confirm	  that	  our	  
password-­‐changing	   protocol	   authenticates	   and	   transmits	   pole	   device	   data	   securely	   and	   in	   real-­‐time	  
under	  varying	  maintenance	  scenarios.	  	  	  
Although	   we	   assumed	   that	   the	   data	   collector	   devices	   belong	   to	   the	   control	   center,	   there	   can	   be	  
situations	   where	   the	   data	   collector	   devices	   are	   considered	   untrustworthy.	   Besides,	   extending	   the	  
security	   perimeter	   to	   a	   vast	   number	   of	   data	   collector	   devices	   might	   be	   expensive	   and	   can	   even	   be	  
infeasible	  when	   the	  data	  collection	  architecture	   is	   changeable	  or	  data	  collector	  devices	  are	  mobile.	   In	  
these	  cases,	   the	  data	  collector	  devices	  do	  not	  need	  to	  read	  or	  understand	  the	  data	  but	  only	  relay	  the	  
data	  back	  to	  the	  control	  center.	  So,	  the	  measurement	  devices	  need	  to	  encrypt	  the	  data	  in	  a	  way	  so	  that	  
the	  data	  collector	  device	  does	  not	  have	  access	   to	  data	  even	   if	   it	   carries	   them.	   In	  addition,	   it	  needs	   to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  data	  will	  remain	  secure	  even	  if	  the	  data	  collector	  device	  is	  compromised.	  To	  solve	  this	  
problem,	   other	   researchers,	   Gyorgy	   Dan	   and	   King-­‐Shan	   Lui,	   extended	   our	   SCAPACH	   approach	   and	  
designed	  a	  key	  establishment	  and	  data	  collection	  protocol	   in	   [1].	  The	  protocol	  named	  SELINDA	  allows	  
data	   to	   be	   securely	   transferred	   from	  measurement	   devices	   to	   power	   system	   operator	   via	   mobile	   or	  
untrustworthy	   data	   collectors.	   Moreover,	   the	   focus	   was	   to	   design	   the	   protocol	   as	   computationally	  
lightweight	   as	   possible	   (i.e.,	   minimizing	   the	   number	   of	   expensive	   cryptographic	   operations	   and	   the	  
number	  of	  messages	  exchanged	  between	  devices).	  I	  implemented	  the	  protocol,	  ran	  several	  experiments	  
to	  see	  the	  performance,	  and	  we	  jointly	  reviewed	  the	  design	  of	  the	  protocol.	   In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  our	  
thesis,	   we	   describe	   the	   SELINDA	   protocol	   along	   with	   the	   experimental	   results	   presented	   in	   [1].	   Our	  
experimental	  results	  confirm	  that	  SELINDA	  protocol	  collects	  data	  in	  a	  secure,	  fast	  and	  efficient	  manner.	  	  
	  1.3	  Thesis	  Outline	  
We	  first	  present	  some	  background	  information	  about	  cryptographic	  algorithms	  in	  chapter	  2.	  In	  chapter	  3	  
we	   look	  at	  some	  of	   the	  related	  works.	   In	  chapter	  4	  we	  define	  the	  model	  and	  architecture	  considered.	  
We	  present	   the	  SCAPACH	   framework	   for	   secure	  authentication	  and	  delivery	  of	  data	   in	   chapter	  5.	  We	  
describe	   the	   SELINDA	   framework	   for	   secure	   delivery	   of	   data	   by	   measurement	   devices	   to	   the	   power	  
operator	  using	  mobile	  and	  untrustworthy	  data	  collector	  device	  in	  chapter	  6.	  We	  conclude	  in	  chapter	  7	  






In	   this	   chapter	   we	   discuss	   some	   background	   schemes	   that	   are	   used	   later	   in	   the	   thesis.	  We	   describe	  
symmetric	   and	   asymmetric	   key	   cryptography,	   cryptographic	   hash	   function	   and	   physical	   Unclonable	  
function.	  
	  2.1	  Symmetric	  Key	  Cryptography	  
Symmetric	   key	   cryptography	   is	   an	   encryption	   system	   in	  which	   the	   sender	   and	   receiver	   of	   a	  message	  
share	  a	  single,	  common	  key	  that	  is	  used	  both	  to	  encrypt	  and	  decrypt	  the	  message.	  In	  practice	  the	  keys	  
represent	  a	  shared	  secret	  between	  two	  or	  more	  parties	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  maintain	  a	  private	  link	  for	  
communication.	  Symmetric-­‐key	  cryptography	  is	  also	  known	  as	  secret-­‐key	  cryptography	  and	  private	  key	  
cryptography.	  Figure	  2.1	  describes	  the	  symmetric	  key	  cryptography.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2.1:	  Symmetric	  Key	  Cryptography	  
	  
Symmetric-­‐key	  cryptography	   is	   simpler	  and	   faster,	  but	   its	  main	  drawback	   is	   that	   the	   two	  parties	  must	  
somehow	   exchange	   the	   key	   in	   a	   secure	   way.	   Widely	   used	   symmetric	   key	   algorithms	   are	   Advanced	  
Encryption	   Standard	   (AES),	   RC4,	   Blowfish,	   Data	   Encryption	   Standard	   (DES),	   and	   triple	   DES.	   In	   our	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experiments	  AES	  is	  used	  as	  symmetric	  key	  algorithm	  to	  encrypt	  telemetric	  readings.	  High	  speed	  and	  low	  
RAM	   requirements	  were	   criteria	  while	   designing	   the	   AES	   process.	   Thus	   AES	   performs	  well	   on	   a	  wide	  
variety	  of	  hardware,	  from	  8-­‐bit	  smart	  cards	  to	  high-­‐performance	  computers.	  Below	  is	  a	  short	  description	  
on	  how	  AES	  works.	  
Advanced	  Encryption	  Standard	  (AES):	  AES	  [34]	  is	  iterative,	  symmetric-­‐key	  block	  cipher	  that	  can	  use	  keys	  
of	  sizes	  128,	  192,	  and	  256	  bits.	  It	  encrypts	  and	  decrypts	  data	  in	  blocks	  of	  128	  bits	  (16	  bytes).	  The	  input	  
block	  of	  128	  bits	  is	  arranged	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  matrix	  of	  4	  ×	  4	  bytes	  (Figure	  2.2).	  AES	  uses	  a	  loop	  structure	  
that	  repeatedly	  performs	  permutations	  and	  substitutions	  of	  the	  input	  data.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2.2:	  Representation	  of	  Input/Output	  Blocks	  in	  AES	  
	  
The	  overall	  structure	  of	  AES	  encryption/decryption	  for	  128-­‐bit	  key	  size	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2.3.	  IN	  AES,	  the	  
encryption	   key	   is	   first	   expanded	   into	   a	   key	   schedule	   that	   consists	   of	   44	   4-­‐byte	   words.	   Encryption	  
includes	  10	  rounds	  of	  processing	  for	  128-­‐bit	  keys,	  12	  rounds	  for	  192-­‐bit	  keys,	  and	  14	  rounds	  for	  256-­‐bit	  
keys.	   Except	   for	   the	   last	   round	   in	   each	   case,	   all	   other	   rounds	   are	   identical.	   Each	   round	   of	   processing	  
includes	   one	   single-­‐byte	   based	   substitution	   step,	   a	   row-­‐wise	   permutation	   step,	   a	   column-­‐wise	  mixing	  
step,	   and	   the	   addition	   of	   the	   round	   key	   step.	   The	   order	   in	   which	   these	   four	   steps	   are	   executed	   is	  
different	  for	  encryption	  and	  decryption	  (Figure	  2.3).	  
For	  encryption,	  the	  first	  three	  steps	  are	  permutation	  and	  substitution	  on	  input	  block	  data,	  whereas,	  the	  
last	   step	   consists	   of	   XORing	   the	   output	   of	   the	   previous	   three	   steps	   with	   four	   words	   from	   the	   key	  
schedule.	   These	   four	   rounds	   are	   called	   SubBytes,	   ShiftRows,	  MixColumns,	   and	   AddRoundKey.	   During	  
SubBytes,	  a	  lookup	  table	  is	  used	  to	  determine	  what	  each	  byte	  is	  replaced	  with.	  The	  ShiftRows	  step	  has	  a	  
certain	   number	   of	   rows	  where	   each	   row	   of	   the	   state	   is	   shifted	   cyclically	   by	   a	   particular	   offset,	  while	  
leaving	  the	  first	  row	  unchanged.	  Each	  byte	  of	  the	  second	  row	  is	  shifted	  to	  the	  left,	  by	  an	  offset	  of	  one,	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each	  byte	  in	  the	  third	  row	  by	  an	  offset	  of	  two,	  and	  the	  fourth	  row	  by	  an	  offset	  of	  three.	  The	  MixColumns	  
step	  is	  a	  mixing	  operation	  using	  an	  invertible	  linear	  transformation	  in	  order	  to	  combine	  the	  four	  bytes	  in	  
each	   column.	   The	   four	   bytes	   are	   taken	   as	   input	   and	   generated	   as	   output.	   In	   the	   fourth	   round,	   the	  
AddRoundKey	  derives	  round	  keys	  from	  key	  schedule,	  and	  adds	  the	  round	  key	  to	  each	  byte	  of	  the	  state.	  
Each	  round	  key	  gets	  added	  by	  combining	  each	  byte	  of	  the	  state	  with	  the	  corresponding	  byte	  from	  the	  
round	  key.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2.3:	  	  AES	  Encryption/Decryption	  for	  128-­‐bit	  Key	  
	  
For	   decryption,	   each	   round	   consists	   of	   the	   following	   four	   steps:	   inverse	   shift	   rows,	   inverse	   substitute	  
bytes,	  add	  round	  key,	  and	  inverse	  mix	  columns.	  The	  inverse	  steps	  perform	  the	  opposite	  transformations	  
of	  each	  corresponding	  steps.	  The	  third	  step	  consists	  of	  XORing	  the	  output	  of	  the	  previous	  two	  steps	  with	  
four	  words	  from	  the	  key	  schedule.	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2.2	  Asymmetric	  Key	  Cryptography	  
An	  asymmetric	   key	   cryptography	   is	   a	   cryptographic	   system	   that	  uses	  a	   key	  pair	   that	   includes	  a	  public	  
key,	  known	  to	  everyone,	  and	  a	  private	  or	  secret	  key,	  known	  only	  to	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  message.	  The	  
two	  parts	  of	   this	   key	  pair	   are	  mathematically	   linked.	  The	  public	   key	   is	  used	   to	  encrypt	  plaintext	  or	   to	  




Figure	  2.4:	  Asymmetric	  Key	  Cryptography	  
	  
Therefore	  two	  main	  uses	  for	  public-­‐key	  cryptography	  are:	  
i. Public-­‐key	  encryption,	  in	  which	  a	  data	  is	  encrypted	  with	  the	  receiver’s	  public	  key.	  The	  message	  
cannot	  be	  decrypted	  by	  anyone	  who	  does	  not	  have	  the	  matching	  private	  key.	  Thus	  he	  presumed	  
to	   be	   the	   owner	   of	   that	   key	   and	   the	   person	   associated	  with	   the	   public	   key.	   This	   ensures	   the	  
confidentiality	  of	  the	  message.	  
ii. Digital	  signatures,	  in	  which	  a	  message	  is	  signed	  with	  the	  sender's	  private	  key	  and	  can	  be	  verified	  
by	  anyone	  who	  has	  access	  to	  the	  associated	  public	  key.	  This	  verification	  proves	  that	  the	  sender	  
had	  access	  to	  the	  private	  key,	  and	  therefore	   is	  the	  person	  associated	  with	  the	  public	  key.	  This	  
also	   ensures	   that	   the	   message	   has	   not	   been	   tampered	   with,	   since	   any	   manipulation	   of	   the	  




Widely	   used	   asymmetric	   key	   algorithms	   are	   Diffie–Hellman	   key	   exchange	   protocol,	   RSA,	   DSS	   (Digital	  
Signature	   Standard),	   ElGamal	   etc.	   Following	   is	   the	   description	   of	   how	   Diffie-­‐Hellman	   key	   exchange	  
works.	  
Diffie-­‐Hellman	  key	  exchange	  (DH):	  The	  Diffie-­‐Hellman	  key	  exchange	  [32]	  works	  as	  follows:	  when	  Alice	  
and	  Bob	  want	  to	  establish	  a	  shared	  key,	  Alice	  picks	  a	  natural	  number	  a	  and	  keeps	  as	  secret.	   	  Similarly,	  
Bob	  picks	  a	  natural	  number	  b	  as	  his	  secret.	   	  Alice	  sends	  ga	  mod	  p	   to	  Bob,	  and	  Bob	  sends	  gb	  mod	  p	  to	  
Alice.	  When	  Alice	  receives	  gb	  mod	  p,	  she	  computes	  the	  shared	  key	  by	   (gb	  mod	  p)a	  mod	  p	  =	  gab	  mod	  p.	  	  
Bob,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  computes	  the	  shared	  key	  by	  (ga	  mod	  p)b	  mod	  p	  =	  gab	  mod	  p.	  Note	  that	  although	  
an	  eavesdropper	  knows	  p,	  g,	  ga	  mod	  p,	  and	  gb	  mod	  p,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  for	  him	  to	  compute	  gab	  mod	  p.	  In	  
this	  thesis,	  we	  call	  ga	  mod	  p	  and	  gb	  mod	  p	  DH	  half	  keys	  or	  DH	  public	  keys.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2.5:	  Diffie-­‐Hellman	  Key	  Exchange	  Algorithm	  
	  2.3	  Cryptographic	  Hash	  Function	  
A	  cryptographic	  hash	  algorithm	  is	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  random	  mapping	  from	  a	  string	  of	  binary	  data	  to	  
a	   fixed-­‐size	   hash	   value,	   also	   called	   “message	   digest”,	   and	   achieve	   certain	   security	   properties.	   Hash	  
algorithms	  can	  be	  used	   for	  digital	   signatures,	  message	  authentication	  codes,	   key	  derivation	   functions,	  
pseudo	  random	  functions,	  and	  other	  security	  applications	  in	  the	  information	  infrastructure.	  [35]	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In	  this	  thesis,	  we	  use	  cryptographic	  hash	  function	  to	  generate	  new	  key	  or	  password.	  Well-­‐known	  hash	  
functions	   are	  MD4,	  MD5,	   SHA-­‐1	   and	   SHA-­‐2,	   SHA-­‐3.	  We	   use	   SHA-­‐2	   in	   this	   thesis	   as	   hash	   function	   to	  
generate	  new	  key	  or	  password.	  
	  2.4	  Physical	  Unclonable	  Function	  
A	  PUF	   implements	   an	  on-­‐chip	  physical	   function	  puf:	  C	  →	  R	   that	   takes	  an	   input	   challenge	  Chi	  ∈	   C	   and	  
produces	  a	  response	  Rsi	  ∈	  R,	  where	  (C,	  R)	  is	  the	  set	  of	  all	  possible	  challenge-­‐response	  pairs	  (CRPs).	  PUF	  
relies	  on	  the	  intrinsic	  randomness	  during	  the	  integrated	  circuit	  fabrication	  process	  [14].	  Therefore,	  CRPs	  




Figure	  2.6:	  Key	  Generation	  Using	  PUF	  
	  
PUF	   can	  generate	   volatile	   cryptographic	   keys	  with	   low-­‐cost	   [3]	  when	  a	   challenge	   is	   given.	   In	  practice,	  
error	  correction	  codes	  (e.g.,	  Reed-­‐Solomon)	  are	  used	  to	  remove	  the	  noise	  from	  the	  PUF	  response	  and	  
make	  it	  stable	  and	  identical.	  The	  output	  of	  the	  error	  correction	  unit	  (ECU)	  of	  length	  t	  is	  hashed	  down	  by	  
the	  hash	  function	  H1:	   {0,	  1}t	  →	  {0,	  1}m	   to	  a	  desired	  key	  KC	  of	   length	  m.	  KC	   is	  used	  for	  communication	  
between	  DC	  and	  MD	  during	  the	  initial	  setup	  (detail	  in	  Section	  III).	  The	  key	  generation	  process	  using	  PUF	  
is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2.6.	  







Security	   in	   smart	   grids	   is	   a	   challenging	   problem	   for	   many	   reasons	   [22],	   [23].	   One	   of	   the	   biggest	  
challenges	   comes	   from	   connecting	   the	   grid	   with	   a	   plethora	   of	   devices	   with	   limited	   memory,	  
computational	   power	   and	   network	   connectivity	   [22].	   Furthermore,	   interoperability	   and	   legacy-­‐
compliance	  are	  also	  key	  concerns	   [23].	  Therefore,	  general-­‐purpose	   Internet	   security	  protocols	  are	  not	  
adequate,	  and	  new	  security	  protocols	  tailored	  for	  the	  smart	  grid	  need	  to	  be	  developed.	  
Password	  verification	  problem	  over	  an	   insecure	  network	  has	  been	   investigated	   for	  a	   long	   time.	  Many	  
existing	  security	  solutions	  have	  been	  built	  based	  on	  Diffie-­‐Hellman	  (DH)	  key	  exchange	  protocol	  [32].	  In	  
1992,	  Bellovin	  and	  Merritt	  [33]	  proposed	  Encrypted	  Key	  Exchange	  (EKE)	  protocol,	  which	  is	  a	  password-­‐
authenticated	   key	   agreement	  method,	   based	   on	   RSA	   [31]	   and	   DH	   [32].	   Protocols	   such	   as	   SPEKE	   [8],	  
DHEKE	   [4],	   A-­‐EKE	   [6],	   and	   SRP	   [5]	   have	   been	   proposed	   in	   later	   time,	   which	   are	   strongly	   secured	  
protocols	  of	   the	  EKE	   family.	  These	  approaches	  are	  computationally	  expensive.	  Besides,	   the	  number	  of	  
messages	  exchanged	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  is	  not	  trivial.	  Since	  the	  Measurement	  devices	  have	  limited	  
storage	   and	   computational	   capacity,	   lightweight	   (in	   terms	   of	   memory	   and	   computation	   overhead)	  
protocols	   for	   measurement	   device	   is	   needed	   to	   perform	   associated	   cryptography	   [13].	   Thus	   existing	  
general-­‐purpose	  protocols	  are	  not	  suitable	  for	  smart-­‐grid	  systems.	  
Secure	  authentication	  for	  smart	  grids	  has	  been	  considered	  in	  [24],	  [25].	  The	  focus	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  
is	  on	  how	  to	  establish	  a	  shared	  key	  for	  data	  authentication	  between	  two	  entities.	  The	  two	  entities	  need	  
to	   establish	   a	   session,	  which	  may	   be	   infeasible	   in	   the	   hierarchical	   data	   collection	  model.	   [21]	   studies	  
how	  to	  access	  power	  system	  devices	  remotely	  for	  substation	  monitoring.	  The	  substation	  controller	  (or	  
data	  concentrator)	  is	  used	  as	  the	  central	  point	  of	  access	  control.	  The	  substation	  controller	  authenticates	  
users	  and	  keeps	  access	  logs,	  and	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  trusted.	  However,	  the	  issue	  of	  securing	  data	  between	  
the	  devices	  and	  the	  utility	  is	  not	  considered	  in	  this	  work.	  
Key	  management	   is	   another	   important	   issue	   in	   security.	   Traditional	   PKI	   systems	   (e.g.,	   X.509)	   are	   not	  
used	   in	   smart	   grid	   due	   to	   their	   structural	   complexity	   and	   cost	   for	   establishing	   and	   managing	   the	  
framework.	   As	   compared	   to	   the	   PKI	   systems,	   Identity-­‐Based	  Cryptography	   (IBC)	   is	  much	   simpler	   [11].	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Shamir	  [11]	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  IBC	  and	  since	  then	  many	  ID-­‐based	  key	  agreement	  protocols	  have	  
been	   proposed.	   In	   [12],	   IBC-­‐based	   cryptography	   system	   is	   used	   for	   communications	   in	   smart	   grid	  
networks,	  where	  machine	   identification	  number	  of	  a	  device	   is	  used	  to	  generate	  unique	  keys.	  Not	  only	  
this	  scheme	  is	  computationally	  expensive	  but	  also	   it	   requires	  a	  modification	   inside	  each	  measurement	  
device	  (i.e.,	  the	  memory	  of	  pole-­‐top	  Measurement	  devices	  needs	  to	  be	  reconfigured)	  when	  a	  new	  data	  
collector	  device	  is	  added.	  This	  approach	  is	  not	  feasible	  in	  the	  scenario	  that	  we	  are	  considering	  because	  
of	  the	  limited	  change	  management	  capabilities	  [2]	  of	  the	  Measurement	  devices.	  	  
The	   authors	   in	   [18]	   propose	   to	   have	   a	   trust	   anchor	   for	   performing	   mutual	   authentication	   and	   key	  
establishment	   between	   a	   device	   and	   a	   collector.	   This	   approach	  may	   not	   be	   scalable	   when	   there	   are	  
many	  devices.	  In	  [26]	  authors	  study	  which	  unicast	  and	  multicast	  sessions	  need	  to	  be	  secured	  in	  a	  wide-­‐
area	  measurement	   system.	  The	  authors	   suggest	   keys	   to	  be	  established	  by	  direct	   connection	  between	  
the	  two	  entities	  that	  need	  shared	  keys.	  Thus,	  the	  scheme	  is	  not	  suitable	  for	  secure	  data	  collection	  via	  a	  
data	   collector.	   The	   work	   in	   [27]	   describes	   a	   key	   management	   scheme	   for	   unicast,	   multicast,	   and	  
broadcast	  messages	   in	  AMI.	  The	  keys	  form	  a	  graph	  so	  that	  keys	  are	  easily	  stored	  and	  derived.	  Session	  
keys	   are	   generated	   based	   on	   previously	   read	   data.	   Nevertheless,	   this	   scheme	   cannot	   be	   applied	   in	  
hierarchical	  data	  collection	  architecture.	  
Another	  line	  of	  work	  deals	  with	  data	  collection	  between	  multiple	  entities	  in	  smart	  grid.	  In	  [20]	  authors	  
describe	   a	   lightweight	   and	   scalable	   transport	   protocol	   for	   establishing	   multiple	   sessions	   among	  
Measurement	  devices	  to	  the	  control	  center.	  	  The	  study	  focuses	  on	  how	  to	  reduce	  the	  storage	  needed	  in	  
maintaining	   the	   state	   information	   of	   the	  massive	   amount	   of	   sessions.	   The	   session	   keys	   used	   can	   be	  
derived	  so	  that	  the	  control	  center	  does	  not	  have	  to	  remember	  a	  lot	  of	  keys.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  number	  of	  
sessions	  maintained	  is	  still	  proportional	  to	  the	  number	  of	  Measurement	  devices.	  The	  protocol	  is	  also	  not	  
suitable	   for	   the	   hierarchical	   data	   collection	   architecture	   in	   which	   a	   data	   collector	   is	   responsible	   for	  
collecting	  and/or	  processing	  data	   from	  multiple	  Measurement	  devices	  before	   sending	   the	  data	   to	   the	  
control	   center.	   The	   authors	   in	   [19]	   develop	   a	   transport	   protocol	   for	   reporting	   data	   through	   a	   data	  
collector.	  Two	  separate	  TCP	  connections	  are	  maintained:	  one	  between	  the	  control	  center	  and	  the	  data	  
collector,	  and	  another	  between	  the	  measurement	  device	  and	  the	  data	  collector.	  Each	  connection	  can	  be	  
protected	  independently.	  This	  approach	  does	  not	  consider	  the	  limited	  change	  management	  capabilities	  
of	  Measurement	  devices.	  In	  addition	  this	  approach	  assumes	  that	  the	  data	  collector	  is	  trustworthy,	  which	  
may	  not	  be	  always	  the	  case	  when	  the	  data	  collector	  is	  outsourced	  or	  compromised.	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To	   the	   best	   of	   our	   knowledge,	   there	   is	   no	   existing	  work	   that	   allows	   generation	   of	   short-­‐lived	   device	  
password	   and	   keys	   for	   data	   collection	   in	   hierarchical	   data	   collection	   architecture	   under	   the	   stated	  
constraints.	   In	   this	   thesis,	   we	   present	   a	   secure	   a	   scalable	   password-­‐changing	   protocol	   for	   smart	   grid	  
device	   authentication.	  We	  address	   the	   limited	   change	  management	   capability	   problem	  as	  well	   as	   the	  
memory	  and	  computational	  constraint	  problem	  of	  Measurement	  devices.	  To	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  
this	  is	  the	  very	  first	  attempt	  to	  address	  our	  goals.	  	  
There	   is	  also	  no	  such	  work	  that	  allows	  an	  utility/control	  center	  to	  generate	  different	  shared	  keys	  with	  
different	  Measurement	  devices	  in	  a	  scalable	  manner.	  Existing	  standard	  protocols	  such	  as	  DNP3	  [28]	  and	  
TLS	  [29]	  are	  not	  suitable	  for	  the	  scenario	  when	  the	  data	  collectors	  are	  untrusted	  and	  potentially	  mobile	  
with	  intermittent	  connectivity.	  DNP3	  [28]	  is	  a	  standard	  communication	  protocol	  used	  for	  telecontrol	  and	  
telemetry	   in	   SCADA	   systems.	   Its	   security	   model	   is	   not	   designed	   to	   provide	   data	   integrity	   and	  
confidentiality	   against	   compromised	   relay	   nodes,	   as	   it	   assumes	   that	   all	   components	   are	   within	   the	  
security	  perimeter	  of	  the	  operator.	  TLS	  [29],	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  involves	  multiple	  phases	  of	  handshakes	  
and	   is	   therefore	   not	   suitable	   if	   the	   data	   collector	   is	   off-­‐line	   when	   communicating	   the	   measurement	  
devices.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  we	  also	  present	  the	  secure	  and	  lightweight	  protocol	  that	  allows	  a	  power	  operator	  
to	   collect	   data	   from	   measurement	   devices	   using	   potentially	   multiple	   mobile,	   non-­‐trustworthy	   data	  
collectors	  and	  analyze	  the	  lesson	  learned	  from	  the	  experiments.	  




SYSTEM	  MODEL	  AND	  ARCHITECTURE	  
	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter	   we	   present	   the	   system	   model	   and	   assumptions	   for	   the	   framework.	   We	   present	   the	  
hierarchical	  data	  collection	  architecture	  in	  Section	  4.1.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  the	  description	  of	  the	  network	  
model	   that	   we	   are	   considering	   in	   sections	   4.2.	   In	   Section	   4.3	   we	   present	   the	   data	   model.	   The	   user	  
security	  model	  and	  possible	  attack	  scenarios	  are	  presented	  in	  Sections	  4.4	  and	  4.5	  respectively.	  	  	  
	  4.1	  Architecture	  
Smart	   grid	   system	   uses	   a	   vast	   number	   of	   telemetric	   measurement	   devices,	   which	   are	   sensors	   with	  
capacitor	   banks.	   These	   devices	   are	   placed	   on	   top	   of	   electric	   poles.	   These	   telemetric	   measurement	  
devices	   usually	   measure	   frequency,	   voltage	   and	   current	   readings	   from	   power	   lines	   and	   store	   them	  
locally.	   The	   measured	   telemetric	   data	   has	   to	   be	   delivered	   to	   a	   control	   center	   (i.e.,	   utility	   company)	  
securely.	   It	   is	  not	  possible	  to	  use	  power	   line	  communication	  (PLC)	  to	  deliver	  the	  measured	  data,	  since	  
the	  amount	  of	  data	   is	   large.	  Besides,	   it	   is	  very	  expensive	  for	  each	  device	  to	  maintain	  a	  secure	  wireless	  
connection	  with	   the	   control	   center	   to	   report	  data	  periodically.	   Therefore,	   the	  maintenance	  personnel	  
(operators)	  from	  utility	  companies	  collect	  data	  readings	  from	  these	  measurement	  devices	  to	  their	  data	  
collector	  devices	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  health	  of	  power	  line	  is	  sound	  and	  stable.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.1:	  In-­‐Field	  Scenario	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As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4.1,	  to	  collect	  data,	  usually	  maintenance	  personnel	  carrying	  a	  data	  collector	  device	  
drive	   their	   truck	   from	   pole	   to	   pole.	   After	   coming	   in	   the	   range	   of	   radio	   network	   under	   a	   pole,	   the	  
operator	  and	  the	  data	  collector	  device	  need	  to	  authenticate	  to	  the	  measurement	  device.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  
operator	   collect	  data	  using	   a	  data	   collector	  device	   from	  multiple	  measurement	  devices.	   The	  operator	  
delivers	   the	   measurements	   to	   the	   control	   center	   when	   data	   collection	   from	   multiple	   measurement	  
devices	  is	  complete.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.2:	  A	  Three	  Level	  Hierarchical	  Data	  Collection	  Model	  
	  
Efficiency	   and	   scalability	   of	   the	   data	   collection	   process	   arguably	   require	   a	   hierarchical	   data	   collection	  
framework	   to	   be	   adopted.	   Figure	   4.2	   shows	   a	   simplified	   hierarchical	   data	   collection	   model.	   Data	  
collectors	   (DCs)	  collect	  data	   from	  measurement	  devices	   (MDs),	  and	  send	  the	  data	   to	  a	  control	  center,	  
typically	  owned	  by	  the	  power	  operator	  (PO).	  	  	  
	  
Table	  4.1	  Notations	  of	  System	  Principals	  







Data	  Collector	  	  




Each	  Data	   collector	   (DC)	   is	   responsible	   for	   collecting	  data	   from	  multiple	  measurement	  devices	   (MDs),	  
and	   therefore	   the	   power	   operator	   (PO)	   only	   needs	   to	   communicate	  with	   a	   few	  Data	   collectors	   (DCs)	  
directly,	  keeping	  the	  number	  of	  connections	  small	  to	  maintain	  manageability.	  Each	  measurement	  device	  
(MD)	  takes	  measurements	  from	  the	  physical	  infrastructural	  system	  and	  forwards	  the	  data	  to	  an	  assigned	  
Data	   collector	   (DC).	   Power	   operator	   (PO)	   collects	   data	   from	   multiple	   Data	   collectors	   (DCs).	   Table	   1	  
summarizes	  the	  notation	  of	  system	  principals.	  
	  4.2	  Network	  Model	  
In	   our	   smart-­‐grid	   setup,	   sensor	   and	   capacitor	   banks,	   placed	   on	   electric	   poles,	   measure	   telemetric	  
measurements	   from	  power	   line	   and	   store	   it	   in	   a	   local	  memory	   as	  mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   section	  
(Figure	   4.1).	   A	   radio	   attached	   underneath	   the	   capacitor	   banks	   is	   used	   to	   transfer	   the	   stored	   data	  
readings.	  We	  consider	  two	  devices	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  -­‐	  a	  measurement	  device	  (MD)	  that	  produces	  
data	  measurements	  from	  the	  capacitor	  banks	  and	  a	  data	  collector	  device	  (DC)	  that	  collects	  these	  data	  
readings.	   A	   point-­‐to-­‐point	   radio	   (wireless)	   network	   is	   established	   between	   DC	   and	   MD	   as	  
communication	  channel.	  The	  standard	  we	  use	  in	  our	  validation	  is	  IEEE	  802.11n.	  However,	  other	  wireless	  
standards	  such	  as	  IEEE	  802.15.4	  (Zigbee)	  can	  also	  be	  used.	  	  
A	  secure	  communication	  channel	  (wired	  or	  wireless)	  is	  established	  within	  the	  control	  center’s	  perimeter,	  
and	   is	   used	   to	   transfer	   data	   from	   DCs	   to	   PO.	   However,	   extending	   the	   security	   perimeter	   to	   a	   vast	  
number	   of	   DCs	   is	   expensive	   and	   can	   even	   be	   infeasible	   when	   the	   data	   collection	   architecture	   is	  
changeable	  or	  DCs	  are	  mobile.	  In	  this	  thesis	  we	  consider	  both	  cases,	  i.e.,	  a	  security	  perimeter	  is	  present	  
to	  transfer	  the	  data	  readings	  from	  DCs	  to	  PO	  and	  no	  security	  perimeter	  is	  present	  to	  transfer	  the	  data	  
readings.	  
	  4.3	  Data	  Model	  
Usually,	   measurement	   devices	   (MDs)	   collect	   telemetric	  measurements	   of	   frequency,	   current,	   voltage	  
readings	  of	  power	  lines	  and	  store	  these	  measurements	  locally.	  According	  to	  the	  utility	  companies	  [10],	  
these	  telemetric	  measurements	  are	  not	  sent	  over	  PLC	  (Power	  Line	  Communication)	  because	  the	  amount	  
of	  data	  is	  large.	  The	  measurements	  are	  sent	  from	  the	  measurement	  devices	  to	  the	  data	  collector	  devices	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over	   the	   wireless	   network	   in	   small	   packets.	   Intruders	   may	   get	   unauthorized	   access	   and	   change	   the	  
telemetric	  measurements	  maliciously	  at	   the	  measurement	  device,	  which	  may	   lead	   to	  wrong	  decision-­‐
making	   at	   the	   utility.	   Therefore,	   securing	   the	   access	   of	   devices	   (both	  measurement	   device	   and	   data	  
collector	  device)	  and	  the	  communication	  channel	  between	  them	  is	  important	  for	  the	  utility	  companies.	  	  
	  4.4	  User	  Security	  Model	  
We	  assume	  that	  the	  operator	  can	  only	  access	  a	  data	  collector	  device	  if	  s/he	  has	  a	  unique	  identification	  
number,	  OPid	  and	  a	  user	  password	  that	  is	  shared	  among	  operators.	  There	  is	  a	  trusted	  setup	  phase	  at	  the	  
utility	   site	   prior	   to	   any	   communication,	   when	   OPid–password	   database	   is	   stored	   on	   data	   collector	  
devices.	   In	   addition,	   key	   based	   hash	   functions	   (e.g.,	   SHA-­‐2),	   pseudorandom	   generator	   function,	  
necessary	   crypto	   algorithms	   such	   as	   symmetric	   key	   algorithm	   (e.g.,	   AES)	   and	   public-­‐key	   encryption	  
algorithm	  (e.g.,	  RSA)	  are	  agreed	  upon	  and	   installed	  on	  utility,	  data	  collector	  and	  measurement	  device.	  
The	  installation	  and	  update	  configuration	  of	  functions/keys	  on	  measurement	  device	  are	  critical	  and	  out	  
of	  the	  current	  scope	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Note	  that	  we	  do	  not	  include	  integrity	  check	  of	  data	  readings	  by	  data	  
collector	  and/or	  utility	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  (Chapter	  5).	  Also,	  we	  do	  not	  include	  human	  operator	  
authentication	   in	   the	   second	   part	   of	   our	   thesis	   (Chapter	   6).	   However,	   if	   the	   utility	   requires,	   human	  
operator	   authentication	   step	   can	   be	   included	   before	   any	   communication	   between	   data	   collector	   and	  
measurement	  device.	  	  
For	   the	   SCAPACH	  protocol,	  we	  use	  both	   symmetric	   and	  public-­‐key	  encryption	   algorithms	   for	   protocol	  
message	   communication	   over	   the	   wireless	   network,	   and	   symmetric-­‐key	   encryption	   algorithm	   for	  
telemetric	   data	   readings.	   For	   key	   establishment	   in	   our	   SELINDA	   framework,	   the	   Diffie-­‐Hellman	   (DH)	  
mechanism	   [32]	   is	   adopted,	   which	   is	   discussed	   in	   Section	   2.2.	   In	   addition,	   public-­‐key	   encryption	  
algorithms	  are	  used	  for	  communication	  over	  the	  wireless	  network.	  
	  4.5	  Attack	  Model	  
Since	   the	   whole	   communication	   system	   exists	   in	   an	   open	   environment,	   security	   barriers	   to	   prevent	  
unauthorized	   access	   by	   potential	   eavesdropper	   or	   active	   attacker	   are	   extremely	   necessary.	   In	   this	  
thesis,	  we	  only	   consider	   cyber-­‐security	  attacks.	  Physical	   attacks	  and	   security	  protections	  against	   them	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are	  out	  of	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  An	  attacker	  may	  try	  to	  get	  access	  of	  the	  devices	  by	  faking	  identities	  if	  the	  
attacker	  gets	  the	  shared	  user	  password.	  Besides,	  since	  the	  network	  is	  wireless,	  attacker	  may	  eavesdrop	  
on	  the	  communications	  and	  place	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attack	  on-­‐site	  or	  a	  replay	  attack	  at	  later	  time.	  Even	  
worse	   attackers	   may	   get	   access	   to	   measurement	   device,	   break	   cryptographic	   keys	   information	   and	  
falsify/tamper	  with	   the	   telemetric	  data.	   	  Also,	   the	   confidentiality	  of	   the	   data	   sent	   in	   earlier	   sessions	  
may	  be	  lost	   if	   the	  long-­‐term	  secrets	  are	  obtained	  by	  the	  attacker	  at	  a	  later	  time.	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CHAPTER	  5	  	  
SCAPACH	  -­‐	  Scalable	  Password-­‐Changing	  Protocol	  for	  Smart	  Grid	  Device	  Authentication	  
	  
	  
In	   this	   section	  we	  present	  a	  SCalable	  and	  Automated	  PAssword-­‐CHanging	  protocol,	  SCAPACH	   [37],	   for	  
unique	  authentication	  of	  human	  personnel	  (operator)	  and	  secure	  collection	  of	  telemetric	  data	  readings	  
from	  a	  large	  number	  of	  measurement	  devices.	  The	  problem	  description	  is	  stated	  in	  Section	  5.1.	  This	   is	  
followed	   by	   a	   description	   of	   the	   assumptions	   in	   Section	   5.2	   and	   detailed	   protocol	   in	   Section	   5.3.	   In	  
Section	  5.4	  we	  analyze	  the	  security	  of	  the	  SCAPACH	  protocol.	  The	  implementation	  details	  are	  presented	  
in	  Section	  5.5	  followed	  by	  the	  evaluation	  in	  Section	  5.6.	  
	  5.1	  Problem	  Description	  
The	   overall	   goal	   is	   to	   ensure	   unique	   and	   secure	   authentication	   of	   human	   personnel	   (operator)	   and	  
secure	   collection	   of	   telemetric	   data	   from	  a	   large	   number	   of	  measurement	   devices	   in	   real-­‐time	  under	  
varying	  maintenance	  scenarios.	  In	  particular	  our	  focus	  is	  on	  delivering	  the	  telemetric	  measurement	  in	  a	  
secure	  and	   fast	  manner	  under	   the	   resource	   constraints	   (in	   terms	  of	  both	  memory	  and	   computation),	  
lengthy	   deployment	   and	   change	   management	   capacity	   of	   measurement	   devices.	   We	   also	   need	   to	  
ensure	   that	   our	   protocol	   performs	   efficiently	   with	   the	   large	   scale	   of	  measurement	   devices	   and	   data	  
collector	   devices.	   Moreover,	   our	   focus	   is	   to	   keep	   the	   protocol	   computationally	   lightweight	   for	   the	  
measurement	  devices	  so	  that	  they	  require	  to	  perform	  very	  few	  expensive	  cryptographic	  operations	  and	  
to	  exchange	  few	  messages.	  	  
The	   problem	   is	   to	   generate	   unique	   passwords	   and	   symmetric	   keys	   for	   authentication	   and	   encryption	  
respectively,	  when	  operators	   (OP1,	  OP2,	  …,	  OPi)	   use	   data	   collector	   devices	   (DC1,	  DC2,…,	  DCi)	   to	   collect	  
data	  from	  measurement	  devices	  (MD1,	  MD2,	  …,	  MDj)	  at	  different	  locations	  (L1,	  L2,	  …,	  Lj)	  at	  different	  times	  





Utilities	   deal	   with	   a	   large	   number	   of	  MDs.	   Operators	   collect	   the	  measurements	   from	  MD	   using	   DCs.	  
Multiple	  operators	  may	  use	  the	  same	  DC	  at	  different	  days	  to	  collect	  telemetric	  data.	  On	  a	  particular	  day,	  
operators	   (OP1,	   OP2,	   …,	   OPi)	   use	   data	   collector	   devices	   (DC1,	   DC2,…,	   DCi)	   to	   collect	   data	   from	  
measurement	  devices	  (MD1,	  MD2,	  …,	  MDj)	  at	  different	  locations	  (L1,	  L2,	  …,	  Lj)	  at	  different	  times	  (TS1,	  TS2,	  
…,	  TSj).	  
For	  maintaining	  confidentiality	  and	  authenticity	  of	   initial	  setup	  messages,	  public-­‐private	  key	  pairs	  (PUj-­‐
PRj)	  are	  defined	  for	  each	  MD,	  and	  stored	  inside	  the	  DCs.	  However,	  since	  MDs	  are	  memory-­‐constrained	  
devices,	  instead	  of	  storing	  public	  keys	  of	  all	  DCs,	  we	  generate	  on-­‐the-­‐fly	  symmetric	  keys	  using	  introduce	  
Physical	  Unclonable	  Functions	  (PUFs)	  [3]	  attached	  with	  MDs	  to	  ensure	  a	  key	  agreement	  between	  DC	  and	  
MD.	   This	   symmetric	   key	   is	   only	   used	   for	   securing	   initial	   protocol	   messages	   between	   them.	   Volatile	  
cryptographic	  key	  generation	  using	  PUF	  is	  discussed	  in	  Section	  2.4.	  
We	   assume	   that	   the	   PUF	   system-­‐on-­‐chip	   (SoC)	   is	   integrated	  with	   each	  MD.	   During	   the	   trusted	   setup	  
phase	  at	  the	  utility	  site,	  the	  utility	  constructs	  CRPs	  for	  the	  PUFs	  inside	  each	  MD,	  which	  is	  also	  stored	  into	  
DCs’	  databases.	  
We	  assume	  that	  MDj	  only	  stores	   its	  own	  private	  key	  (PRj)	  and	  a	  shared	  secret	  with	  DCs	   in	  form	  of	  salt	  
(Scur,j	  <	  1)	  in	  its	  firmware.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  DCi	  has	  a	  list	  of	  public	  keys	  (PU)	  of	  all	  MDs	  in	  its	  memory	  in	  
addition	   to	   all	   CRPs	   associated	   for	   all	   PUFs	   (in	  MDs).	  DC	  also	   stores	   a	   list	   of	   shared	   secrets,	   i.e.,	   salts	  
(Scur,1,	  Scur,2,	  …,	  Scur,j)	  in	  its	  firmware.	  In	  addition,	  a	  database	  of	  OPid-­‐password	  of	  all	  operators	  is	  stored	  in	  
DC	   for	  human	   (operator)	  authentication.	  Both	  devices	  have	   the	  capability	   to	  execute	  AES,	  RSA,	  SHA-­‐2	  
cryptographic	  algorithms	  and	  functions	  (defined	  in	  the	  following	  sections)	  to	  generate	  device	  passwords	  
and	  one-­‐time	  shared	  keys	  (P).	  
	  5.3	  Protocol	  
In	   this	   section,	   we	   present	   our	   password-­‐changing	   protocol,	   SCAPACH	   that	   provides	   robust	  
authentication	  and	  secure	  communication.	  We	  divide	  our	  approach	  into	  three	  phases:	  	  
• Phase	  1:	  	  Authentication	  of	  an	  operator	  (OPk)	  to	  the	  data	  collector	  device	  (DCi)	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• Phase	  2:	  Authentication	  between	   the	  data	  collector	  device	   (DCi)	   and	   the	  measurement	  device	  
(MDj)	  
• Phase	  3:	  Secure	  communication	  between	  the	  data	  collector	  device	  (DCi)	  and	  the	  measurement	  
device	  (MDj).	  
The	   functionalities	  of	   the	  data	  collector	  device	  are	  built	   into	   the	  utility	  car.	  So,	   the	  set	  of	  activities	  on	  
phase	  1,	   i.e.,	  authentication	  of	  the	  operator	  to	  the	  data	  collector	  device,	  needs	  to	  be	  once	  when	  s/he	  
starts	  driving	   for	  collecting	  data,	  and	  not	  at	  each	  pole.	  Moreover,	  operator	  authenticates	  his/her	  data	  
collector	  device	   to	  each	  measurement	  device	  with	  a	  unique	  device	  password	  at	  each	  pole	   location	   to	  
collect	   data	   readings	   (phase	   2	   and	   3).	   Detailed	   steps	   of	   these	   phases	   are	   described	   as	   follows.	  
Mathematical	  notations	  of	  the	  symbols	  used	  in	  this	  section	  are	  given	  in	  Table	  5.1.	  	  
	  
Table	  5.1	  Mathematical	  Notations	  
























Encrypt	  operation	  with	  Public	  Key	  of	  jth	  MD	  
Decrypt	  operation	  with	  Private	  Key	  of	  jth	  MD	  
Sign	  a	  message	  M	  with	  own	  private	  key	  
Encrypt/Decrypt	  with	  symmetric	  key,	  P	  
Encrypt/Decrypt	  with	  symmetric	  key	  KC	  
Session	  shared	  key	  of	  256	  bit	  
Symmetric	  key	  generated	  by	  PUF	  
k	  bits	  of	  P	  starting	  from	  index	  n	  
Number	  of	  bits	  of	  P	  to	  verify	  
Challenge	  for	  PUF	  associated	  with	  jth	  MD	  chosen	  from	  a	  set	  of	  k	  
challenges	  
Salt	  (current	  and	  previous)	  at	  jth	  MD	  
Location	  
Time	  variant	  nonce	  
Random	  number	  
Data	  collector	  Device	  id	  -­‐	  48bit	  MAC	  address	  




Pseudorandom	  generator	  function	  





A. Phase	  1.	  	  All	  methods	  of	  human	  authentication	  fall	  into	  three	  broad	  categories	  [6]:	  
• The	   knowledge	   factors:	   Something	   the	   user	   knows	   (e.g.,	   password,	   pass	   phrase,	   PIN,	  
response	  to	  a	  challenge)	  
• The	  ownership	   factors:	  Something	   the	  user	  has	   (e.g.,	   ID	  card,	   security	   token,	   software	  
token,	  cell	  phone)	  
• The	   inherence	   factors:	  Something	   the	  user	   is	  or	  does	   (e.g.,	   fingerprint,	   retinal	  pattern,	  
DNA	  sequence,	  signature,	  face,	  voice)	  
In	   our	   approach,	   we	   consider	   the	   first	   category	   since	   it	   is	   easier	   to	   use,	   convenient	   and	   less	  
expensive	   to	   deploy	   than	   token-­‐based	   or	   biometric	   methods.	   This	   phase	   deals	   with	   the	  
authentication	  of	  operator	  to	  data	  collector	  device,	  yet	  maintaining	  the	  integrity	  of	  operator.	  To	  
authenticate,	   OPk	   provides	   a	   valid	   unique	   user	   identification	   number	   (OPid)	   and	   shared	   user	  
password	   to	   DCi.	   The	   step	   ensures	   the	   identification	   and	   authentication	   of	   an	   operator.	  
However,	  remote	  software	  robots	  may	  try	  to	  get	  access	  of	  MD	  by	  breaking	  into	  DC.	  To	  protect	  
that,	   a	   CAPTCHA	   test	   [7]	   is	   introduced.	   DC	   generates	   a	   CAPTCHA	   using	   cyber-­‐physical	  
information	   (i.e.,	   GPS	   location,	   temperature,	   and	   data	   collector	   device	   id	   DCid),	   which	   is	  
collected	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  phase	  1	  using	  respective	  sensors.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.1:	  Phase	  1	  -­‐	  Authentication	  of	  Operator	  
	  
Figure	  5.1	  formalizes	  the	  procedure	  of	  a	  robust	  authentication	  of	  OP	  in	  phase	  1.	  Authentication	  
of	  OP	  is	  important	  so	  that	  responsible	  OP	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  case	  of	  an	  insider	  attack.	  After	  OP	  
authenticates,	   DC	   sends	   the	   login	   request	   message	   to	   MD	   (in	   the	   next	   phase).	   Phase	   1	   is	  
associated	  with	  a	  timer	  or	  counter.	  When	  the	  counter	  expires	   (e.g.,	  after	   few	  hours	  or	  visiting	  
few	  different	  locations),	  the	  OP	  needs	  to	  perform	  re-­‐authentication.	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B. Phase	  2.	  In	  this	  phase,	  DC	  authenticates	  itself	  to	  the	  MD	  and	  calculates	  the	  session-­‐shared	  keys	  
(to	  be	  used	  for	  transmitting	  telemetric	  data).	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  OP	  comes	  within	  the	  range	  of	  MD’s	  
wireless	  network,	  DC	  combines	  OPid,	  DCid	  (collected	  in	  phase	  1)	  and	  time	  variant	  nonce	  TS	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  a	  login	  request	  message	  m1.	  DC	  then	  chooses	  a	  challenge-­‐response	  pair,	  Chkj-­‐Rskj	  from	  a	  
set	   of	   k	   CRPs	   stored	   for	   jth	  MD,	   and	   generates	   a	   key	  KC	   by	   hashing	  Rskj	   (using	   hash	   function	  
H1:{0,1}	   t	   →	   {0,1}	   m).	   DC	   encrypts	   message	   m1	   with	   KC	   and	   appends	   Chkj	   so	   that	   MD	   can	  
regenerate	   key	  KC	   from	  Chkj	   using	   the	  PUF	   SoC	   (section	   IIE).	   Thus	   a	   volatile	   key,	  KC	   is	   agreed	  
between	  MD	  and	  DC	  without	  storing	  additional	  keys	  in	  MD.	  	  
The	  DC	  then	  encrypts	  again	  with	  the	  public	  key	  of	  MD	  and	  transmits	  the	  encrypted	  message	  (c1	  
in	  Figure	  5.2)	  to	  MD	  over	  the	  wireless	  network	  to	  initiate	  a	  conversation	  with	  the	  MD.	  Note	  that	  
we	  do	  not	  require	  any	  clock	  synchronization	  between	  MD	  and	  DC.	  
When	  MD	  receives	  m1,	   it	  extracts	  challenge	  Chkj	  by	  decrypting	  c1	  using	  its	  own	  private	  key	  PRj,	  
generates	  key	  KC	  from	  PUF	  (using	  Chkj),	  decrypts	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  message	  with	  KC	  and	  identifies	  
OPid,	  TS	  and	  DCid.	  MD	  generates	  a	  random	  nonce,	  k	  and	  n,	  where	  both	  k	  and	  n	  are	  chosen	  from	  a	  
range	   of	   numbers.	   A	   message	  m2	   is	   constructed	   by	   appending	   nonce,	   k,	   n,	   and	   extracted	   TS	  
(from	  m1)	  together.	  Then	  m2	  is	  transmitted	  to	  DC	  after	  encrypting	  with	  KC	  and	  signing	  with	  MD’s	  
private	  key	  to	  ensure	  the	  confidentiality	  and	  authenticity	  of	  the	  message	  (c2	  in	  Figure	  5.2).	  	  
Next,	   both	  devices	   (MD	  and	  DC)	   start	   calculating	   the	   same	  P	  using	   the	  equation:	   P	   =	  Q	   (OPid,	  
Scur,j,	  nonce).	  Here	  P	  is	  a	  symmetric	  key	  used	  in	  the	  final	  phase	  for	  en/decrypting	  telemetric	  data	  
and	  Q()	  is	  a	  256-­‐bit	  cryptographic	  hash	  function,	  e.g.,	  SHA-­‐2.	  	  
In	   function	   Q(),	   we	   use	   a	   salt	   value,	   Scur,j	   (<1)	   as	   an	   input,	   which	   is	   calculated	   using	   a	  
pseudorandom	  generator	  function	  f()	  with	  seed	  [Sprev,j	  ||	  DCid	  ||	  TS].	  At	  every	  session,	  a	  new	  Scur,j	  
is	  calculated,	  which	  becomes	  Sprev,j	  	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session	  to	  be	  used	  for	  the	  next	  session.	  This	  
way,	   value	   of	   salt	   changes	   for	   every	   session	   based	   on	   a	   secret	   value	   (Sprev,j)	   stored	   in	   the	  
firmware	  of	  both	  MD	  and	  DC	  (installed	  beforehand).	  Hence,	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  the	  attacker	  to	  guess	  
the	  value	  of	  Scur,j.	  
Note	  that	  Scur,j	  values	  vary	  across	  MDs.	  Once	  Scur,j	  is	  assigned	  as	  Sprev,j	  for	  future	  computations,	  the	  
updated	   Sprev,j	   needs	   to	   be	   disseminated	   to	   other	   DCs	   before	   they	   access	   the	   same	  MD.	   The	  
synchronization	  of	  Sprev,j	  across	  the	  DCs	  is	  done	  at	  the	  end-­‐of	  the	  day	  at	  the	  utilities.	  Since	  one	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MD	  is	  accessed	  maximum	  once	  a	  day,	  synchronization	  of	  Sprev,j	  at	  the	  utilities	  does	  not	  require	  
any	  behavioral	  changes	  in	  the	  measurement.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.2:	  Phase	  2	  -­‐	  Authentication	  of	  DC	  to	  MD	  and	  Shared	  Key	  Generation	  
	  
In	  our	  password	  changing	  protocol,	  only	  k	  bits	  from	  index	  n	  of	  shared-­‐symmetric	  key	  P	  are	  used	  
as	   device	   password	   (p/)	   for	   the	   authentication	   of	   DC	   to	  MD	   (different	   from	   the	   OP’s	   shared	  
password	  entered	   in	  phase	  1).	  DC	  picks	  p/	   (message	  m3	   in	  Figure	  5.2),	  encrypts	   it	  with	  KC	   and	  
public	  key	  of	  MD	  and	  transmits	  the	  encrypted	  message	  c3	  to	  the	  MD	  as	  the	  computed	  response.	  
Upon	   receiving	   c3,	   MD	   decrypts	   it	   and	   extracts	   p/	   calculated	   by	   DC.	   The	   MD	   then	   validates	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received	  p/	  with	  the	  self-­‐computed	  p/.	  If	  the	  received	  and	  local	  p/	  values	  do	  not	  match	  with	  each	  
other,	   the	   authentication	   is	   failed	   and	   an	   error	   message,	   ERR	   is	   sent.	   Otherwise,	   an	  
acknowledgement,	  ACK	  is	  sent	  to	  the	  DC.	  	  
Message	  m4	   is	   also	   sent	   after	   signing	   it	   with	   the	   private	   key,	   so	   that	   the	   DC	   knows	   that	   this	  
message	   is	   coming	   from	   a	   legitimate	   MD.	   Sprev,j	   is	   updated	   only	   when	   an	   authentication	   is	  
successful.	  The	  authenticity	  and	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  messages	  is	  maintained	  by	  using	  both	  KC	  
and	  the	  private	  key	   (PRi)	  of	  MD.	  Note	   that	  KC	   is	  not	  used	  as	   the	  symmetric	  key	   for	   telemetric	  
data	  encryption	  in	  phase	  3,	  since	  KC	  repeats	  for	  the	  same	  input	  Chi,	  which	  invalidates	  the	  notion	  
of	  one-­‐time	  password	  and	  key	  generation.	  Therefore,	  one-­‐time	  key	  P	  is	  generated	  in	  this	  phase.	  
	  
C. Phase	  3.	   In	   this	  phase,	  secure	  delivery	  of	   the	  telemetric	  data	   is	  ensured.	  Both	  devices	  use	  the	  
256	  bits	  P	  derived	  in	  phase	  2	  as	  the	  symmetric	  key.	  The	  MDj	  reads	  the	  telemetric	  measurements	  
from	  memory,	   encrypts	   the	   data	  with	  P,	   signs	   and	   sends	   it	   to	  DCi	   over	   the	  wireless	   network.	  
Upon	   receiving	   the	  data	  DCi	   stores	   them	   in	   secure	  database.	  Finally,	   they	  conclude	  when	  MDj	  
sends	  a	  signed	  termination	  message	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  session	  is	  terminated.	  Figure	  5.3	  shows	  
the	  details.	  
	  
	   	  




5.4	  Security	  Analysis	  
In	   this	   section,	  we	  analyze	   the	   security	  of	   SCAPACH	  against	   various	   cyber-­‐attacks	   that	   are	   considered	  
important	  to	  address	  in	  literature	  [9][13].	  
• Replay	  Attack:	  
	  In	   SCAPACH,	   the	  device	   password	   keeps	   changing	   across	   each	  data	   collection	   session.	   Therefore,	  
even	   if	   an	   attacker	   eavesdrops	   the	   flying	   message	   (c3),	   she	   cannot	   use	   it	   for	   future	   sessions	   to	  
authenticate.	   Moreover,	   to	   protect	   against	   replay	   of	   c1,	   an	   alternative	   of	   our	   protocol	   can	   be	  
formulated.	  While	   constructing	   m1/	   (as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   5.2),	   DC	   can	   encrypt	   m1	   separately	   with	  
secret	  Scur,j	  and	  KC,	  and	  send	  both	  of	   them	   in	  m1/.	  Since	  Scur,j	   is	  different	   for	  each	  session,	  MD	  can	  
check	   whether	   c1	   is	   intended	   for	   current	   session	   or	   not	   by	   verifying	   both	  m1.	   Thus	   our	   protocol	  
thwarts	   replay	  attack.	   This	   alternative	  also	   thwarts	  Denial	  of	   Service	   (DoS)	   attacks.	  However,	   this	  
alternative	   introduces	   another	   level	   of	   decryption	   and	   hence,	   there	   is	   a	   tradeoff	   between	   the	  
computational	  cost	  and	  security	  against	  the	  DoS	  attack.	  
• Perfect	  Forward	  Secrecy:	  	  
The	  forward	  secrecy	  property	  ensures	  that	  the	  conversation	  an	  adversary	  recorded	  remains	  secret	  if	  
one	  of	  the	  private	  keys	  is	  compromised	  in	  the	  future.	  In	  our	  protocol,	  even	  if	  an	  intruder	  gets	  access	  
to	   private	   key	   of	  MD,	   she	   cannot	   derive	   the	   messages	   exchanged.	   It	   is	   because,	  m1,	  m2,	  m3	   are	  
encrypted	  using	  KC,	  which	   changes	   depending	   on	   input	   challenges.	   Therefore,	   even	   if	   the	   private	  
key	   is	   compromised,	   attacker	   cannot	   derive	   P	   and	   hence	   SCAPACH	   maintains	   perfect	   forward	  
secrecy.	  
• MITM	  Attack:	  	  
A	   man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	   (MITM)	   attack	   requires	   an	   attacker	   to	   fool	   both	   sides	   of	   a	   legitimate	  
conversation	  [5].	  This	  is	  not	  possible	  in	  our	  protocol	  since	  a	  key	  agreement	  needs	  to	  be	  established	  
between	  DC	  and	  MD	  (more	  discussed	  below).	  	  
• Masquerade	  of	  Measurement	  Device:	  	  
All	  messages	  sent	  from	  DC	  are	  encrypted	  with	  the	  public	  key	  of	  MD.	  To	  protect	  the	  masquerade	  of	  
MD,	  DC	  sends	  time	  variant	  nonce	  (TS)	  that	  MD	  needs	  to	  send	  back	   in	  m2.	  DC	  makes	  sure	  that	   it	   is	  
27	  
	  
talking	   to	  a	   legitimate	  MD	  by	  verifying	   the	   received	  TS	   in	  c2.	  Because,	  attacker	  does	  not	  have	   the	  
private	   key	   of	  MD	   and	   so	   they	   cannot	   decrypt	   and	   reveal	   correct	   TS	   from	   c1.	   Also,	  MD	   signs	   the	  
messages	  with	  its	  private	  key	  PRj,	  which	  also	  ensures	  DC	  that	  it	  is	  communicating	  with	  a	  legitimate	  
MD.	  
• Masquerade	  of	  Data	  collector	  Device:	  	  
An	  intruder	  can	  generate	  a	  garbled	  c1	  and	  send	  it	  to	  MD	  to	  pretend	  like	  DC.	  The	  MD	  extracts	  Ch	  from	  
received	   message	   and	   the	   associated	   PUF	   generates	   the	   key	   KC	   (using	   garbled	   Ch),	   which	   both	  
parties	   need	   to	   use	   for	   further	   communication.	   However,	   according	   to	   the	   property	   of	   PUF,	   an	  
attacker	  can	  never	  produce	  correct	  Rs	  from	  a	  given	  Ch	  [14].	  PUFs	  can	  only	  be	  broken	  by	  numerical	  
modeling	   attacks	   if	   the	   attacker	   knows	   a	   set	   of	   CRPs	   of	   a	   PUF	   [15].	  However,	   no	   CRP	   is	   revealed	  
during	  any	  communication	  in	  our	  protocol.	  So,	  the	  attacker	  can	  never	  derive	  correct	  KC	  and	  hence	  
cannot	   decrypt	   c2.	   Moreover,	   MD	   sends	   the	   nonce	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   used	   as	   an	   input	   to	  
calculate	  P	   only	   for	   that	   session.	   Therefore,	   the	   intruder	   can	   never	   compute	   a	   valid	  P	   and	   hence	  
cannot	  pretend	  to	  be	  an	  authorized	  DC.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.4:	  Experimental	  Setup	  to	  Measure	  the	  Performance	  of	  SCAPCH	  Protocol	  
	  5.5	  Implementation	  
To	  validate	   the	  SCAPACH	  protocol,	  we	  use	   two	   laptops	  as	  DC	  and	  MD	  with	   Intel	  Core	  2	  Duo	  2.26GHz	  
processor	   and	   2GB	   read-­‐only	  memory.	   The	   prototype	   is	   implemented	   in	   Java	   so	   that	   it	   can	   be	   easily	  
ported	  into	  mobile	  phone-­‐like	  devices.	  The	  communication	  between	  laptops	  uses	  wifi	  802.11n	  wireless	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network.	   RSA	   is	   used	   as	   public	   key	   encryption.	   Besides,	   AES	   is	   used	   as	   symmetric	   key	   algorithm	   to	  
encrypt	  telemetric	  readings,	  since	  it	   is	  faster	  for	   larger	  size	  of	  data.	  Figure	  5.4	  shows	  the	  experimental	  
setup.	  
	  5.6	  Evaluation	  
To	   compute	   the	   performance	   of	   SCAPACH,	   we	  measure	   its	   total	   execution	   time,	   which	   is	   730ms	   on	  
average.	  Figure	  5.5	  shows	  the	  CDF	  of	  execution	  times	  of	  SCAPACH	  in	  three	  phases	  over	  100	  executions.	  
The	  authentication	  process	  of	  operator	  in	  Phase	  1	  is	  done	  locally	  at	  DC.	  The	  operator-­‐side	  delay	  in	  this	  
authentication	  process	   is	  considered	  negligible.	  Therefore,	   the	  execution	   time	   in	  Phase	  1	   is	  very	  small	  
(average	  26.7ms).	  	  
Phase	  2	  takes	  the	  highest	  time	  due	  to	  the	  repeated	  communication	  between	  MD	  and	  DC.	  However,	  this	  
execution	   time	   is	   less	   than	  600ms	   in	  most	  of	   the	   cases	   (80%	  cases	   in	   Fig.	   5.5).	   The	  execution	   time	   in	  
Phase	  3	  is	  about	  150ms	  on	  average.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.5:	  Execution	  Time	  of	  SCAPATH	  Over	  100	  Executions	  
	  
Note	   that	  we	  do	  not	   consider	   the	   computational	   time	  of	  PUF	   here	   since	   it	   is	   a	   separate	   SoC	  and	   can	  
generate	   keys	   in	   parallel	   with	   MD.	   The	   network	   communication	   delay	   is	   about	   15-­‐20ms.	   We	   also	  
measure	  the	  execution	  time	  of	  different	  processes	  (e.g.,	  encryption,	  computation	  of	  P,	  etc.)	  inside	  each	  
phase.	  We	  find	  that	  the	  RSA	  encryption-­‐decryption	  time	  is	  the	  main	  contributor	  to	  the	  execution	  time	  in	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phase	  2	  and	  phase	  3.	  We	  run	  our	  experiment	  at	  different	  time	  of	  the	  day	  to	  get	  a	  more	  accurate	  result,	  
since	   the	   network	   delay	   varies	   at	   different	   time	  of	   the	   day.	  Our	   implementation	   results	   indicate	   that	  
SCAPACH	  works	  efficiently.	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CHAPTER	  6	  	  
SELINDA-­‐	  Secure,	  Scalable	  and	  Lightweight	  Data	  Collection	  Protocol	  for	  Smart	  Grids	  
	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  introduce	  a	  Secure,	  Scalable	  and	  Lightweight	  Data	  Collection	  Protocol	  for	  Smart	  Grids	  
that	   allows	   utility	   company	   to	   collect	   telemetric	   data	   readings	   from	   a	   large	   number	   of	  measurement	  
devices	   via	  mobile	   and	   untrusted	   data	   collector.	   The	   problem	   description	   and	   the	   description	   of	   the	  
assumptions	  are	  stated	  in	  Section	  6.1	  and	  Section	  6.2	  respectively.	  The	  detailed	  protocol	  is	  discussed	  in	  
Section	  6.3.	   In	  Section	  6.4	  we	  describe	   the	  protocol	   complexity	  and	   security	  of	   the	  SELINDA	  protocol.	  
The	  implementation	  details	  are	  presented	  in	  Section	  6.5	  followed	  by	  the	  evaluation	  in	  Section	  6.6.	  
	  6.1	  Problem	  Description	  
Security	   in	  the	  smart	  grid	   is	  a	  challenge	  as	  an	   increasing	  number	  of	  sensors	  and	  measurement	  devices	  
are	  connected	  to	  the	  power	  grid.	  General-­‐purpose	  security	  protocols	  are	  not	  suitable	  for	  providing	  data	  
security	  to	  devices	  with	  limited	  memory,	  computational	  power	  and	  network	  connectivity.	   In	  this	  work,	  
the	  goal	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  secure	  and	  lightweight	  scalable	  security	  protocol.	  The	  protocol	  will	  allow	  a	  PO	  to	  
establish	   shared	   keys	   with	   multiple	   MDs	   via	   an	   untrusted	   DC.	   The	   DC	   behaves	   like	   a	   relay	   for	   data	  
communications	  although	  it	  is	  not	  continuously	  connected	  to	  the	  PO.	  Besides,	  the	  DC	  has	  no	  access	  to	  
the	   keys	   established	   between	   the	   PO	   and	   the	  MDs.	   Therefore,	   the	  DC	   can	   potentially	   be	  mobile	   and	  
untrusted,	   which	   makes	   the	   scheme	   essential	   for	   ensuring	   the	   security	   of	   community	   aided	   data	  
collection	  in	  the	  smart	  grid.	  
SELINDA	  [1]	  protocol	  has	  four	  key	  features	  that	  distinguish	  it	  from	  existing	  protocols.	  First,	  the	  protocol	  
is	   computationally	   lightweight	   for	   the	  MDs	   since	   it	   requires	   the	  MDs	   to	   perform	   very	   few	   expensive	  
cryptographic	  operations	  and	  to	  send	  few	  messages.	   	  Thus	  the	  protocol	  supports	  resource	  constrained	  
MDs	   	  with	   limited	  memory	  and	  a	   slow	  CPU.	  Second,	   the	  protocol	  allows	   to	   trade	  off	   computation	   for	  
memory	  requirements	  in	  the	  MDs.	  There	  is	  one	  long-­‐term	  secret	  per	  entity,	  its	  private	  key.	  Thus,	  the	  PO	  
needs	  to	  maintain	  the	  public	  key	  of	  all	  MDs	   in	  the	  system.	   	   It	  also	  maintains	  state	   information	  for	  the	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current	  session	  of	  data	  collection.	  	  The	  MD	  only	  needs	  to	  remember	  its	  own	  private	  key	  and	  the	  public	  
key	  of	   the	  PO.	   	  They	  can	   recalculate	  or	   store	   the	  session	  keys,	  depending	  on	   their	   computational	  and	  
memory	  constraints.	  Third,	  the	  protocol	  provides	  flexible	  association	  between	  DCs	  and	  MDs.	  As	  an	  MD	  
does	  not	  need	  to	  know	  the	  public	  key	  of	  any	  DC,	  the	  PO	  can	  assign	  different	  DCs	  to	  collect	  data	  from	  the	  
same	  MD	  at	  different	  times.	  This	  feature	  is	  particularly	  important	  in	  scenarios	  where	  the	  DCs	  are	  mobile	  
or	  the	  infrastructure	  is	  evolving	  so	  that	  different	  mappings	  or	  assignments	  between	  DCs	  and	  MDs	  can	  be	  
used	   at	   different	   times	   after	   the	   deployment	   of	   the	  MDs.	   Finally,	   the	   protocol	   protects	   the	   collected	  
data	  from	  a	  compromised	  DC.	  Thus,	  an	  attacker	  cannot	  access	  the	  collected	  data	  even	  if	  it	  is	  in	  control	  
of	  a	  DC.	  	  This	  allows	  the	  PO	  to	  outsource	  the	  data	  collection	  procedure	  without	  sacrificing	  security.	  
	  6.2	  Assumptions	  
We	   assume	   that	   the	   PO,	   the	   DCs,	   and	   the	   MDs	   are	   initially	   configured	   with	   the	   following	   set	   of	  
parameters:	  	  	  
Long-­‐term	  keys:	  The	  PO,	  every	  DC,	  and	  every	  MD	  have	  their	  public	  and	  private	  key	  pairs;	  the	  PO	  knows	  
the	  public	  keys	  of	  all	  MDs	  and	  DCs,	  while	  the	  MDs	  know	  the	  public	  key	  of	  the	  PO.	  MD	  does	  not	  store	  the	  
public	  key	  of	  DC	  so	  that	  PO	  can	  flexibly	  assign	  different	  DCs	  to	  collect	  data	  at	  different	  time.	  
	  
Table	  6.1	  Notations	  
Symbol	   Definition	  
K{M}	  
[M]A	  
{M}A	  	  	  	  	  
G(p)	  	  	  	  
Gq(p)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
g	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Encrypt	  message	  M	  using	  shared	  key	  K	  
Sign	  message	  M	  using	  the	  private	  key	  of	  entity	  A	  
Encrypt	  message	  M	  using	  the	  public	  key	  of	  entity	  A	  
Multiplicative	  group	  over	  prime	  p	  
Gq(p)	  Subgroup	  of	  G(p)	  of	  order	  q	  





Diffie-­‐Hellman	  (DH)	  parameters:	   	  The	  PO	  and	  the	  MDs	  agree	  on	  parameters	  of	  the	  prime	  order	  digital	  
signature	  algorithm	  subgroup	  Gq0(p)	  with	  generator	  g	  of	  group	  G(p).	  The	  length	  of	  p	  is	  the	  same	  order	  of	  
magnitude	  as	  that	  of	  a	  public	  key,	  but	  q0	  is	  substantially	  smaller.	  
Cryptographic	   functions:	   The	   PO	   and	   the	   MDs	   have	   a	   common	   set	   of	   cryptographic	   schemes	   for	  
encryption	   (e.g.,	   AES)	   and	   for	   hash	   computation	   (e.g.,	   SHA-­‐256).	   We	   use	   a	   keyed	   hash	   for	   data	  
authentication.	   In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter,	  we	  call	   the	  key	  for	  encrypting	  data	  the	  encryption	  key,	  and	  
the	  key	  for	  providing	  integrity	  the	  integrity	  key.	  
In	   total,	   every	   MD	   has	   to	   store	   one	   private	   key,	   one	   public	   key,	   and	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   group	  
Gq0(p),	   i.e.,	  g,	  q0	  	  and	  p.	  
	  6.3	  Protocol	  
Following	   the	  hierarchical	  data	  collection	  model,	  we	  describe	   the	  SELINDA	  protocol	  based	  on	   the	   two	  
sessions	  that	  it	  consists	  of:	  the	  PO-­‐DC	  session	  and	  the	  DC-­‐MD	  session.	  Figure	  6.1	  illustrates	  the	  complete	  
data	  collection	  process.	  Table	  6.1	  defines	  the	  notations	  used	  in	  the	  figure.	  
	  
A. PO-­‐DC	  Session	  
The	   purpose	   of	   the	   PO-­‐DC	   session	   is	   to	   provide	   to	   DC	   the	   information	   needed	   to	   be	   able	   to	  
collect	  the	  data:	  the	  list	  of	  MDs	  that	  the	  DC	  has	  to	  collect	  data	  from,	  the	  public	  keys	  of	  the	  MDs	  
and	  the	  DH	  half	  keys.	  The	  DH	  half	  keys	  will	  be	  used	  later	  for	  establishing	  the	  encryption/integrity	  
keys	  between	  the	  PO	  and	  the	  MD,	  and	  between	  the	  DC	  and	  the	  MD.	  The	  session	  is	  composed	  of	  
the	  following	  messages	  between	  the	  PO	  and	  the	  DC.	  
(1)	  PO	  to	  DC:	  [{ga	  mod	  p||T1}DC]PO	  
T1	   is	   the	   current	   timestamp	  of	   PO.	  DC	   checks	  whether	  T1	   is	   close	   to	   its	   own	   time.	   To	   detect	  
replay	  attacks,	  DC	  should	  keep	  the	  previous	  T1	  received.	  The	  current	  T1	  is	  accepted	  only	  when	  it	  




Figure	  6.1:	  The	  SELINDA	  Protocol	  
	  
(2)	  DC	  to	  PO:	  [{	  gb	  mod	  p	  }PO	  ]DC	  ,	  K{T1}	  
If	  T1	  is	  valid,	  DC	  generates	  its	  DH	  half	  key	  gb	  mod	  p	  and	  computes	  the	  shared	  key	  K.	  K	  depends	  
on	  gab	  mod	  p,	  T1,	  and	  the	  identity	  of	  DC.	  Recall	  that	  both	  the	  DC	  and	  the	  PO	  know	  the	  function	  
to	   generate	   K,	   thus	   the	   PO	   can	   generate	   K	   after	   receiving	   gb	   mod	   p.	   DC	   sends	   K{T1}	   to	  
authenticate	   itself	   to	   the	   PO,	   which	   the	   PO	   does	   by	   verifying	   T1	   carried	   in	   K{T1}.	   	   If	   the	  
authentication	  is	  successful,	  the	  PO	  can	  send	  to	  the	  DC	  the	  list	  of	  MDs,	  together	  with	  the	  public	  
key	  information	  of	  the	  MDs.	  
(3)	  PO	  to	  DC:	  K{	  MD	  list	  ||	  e	  ||	  C	  },	  where	  C	  =	  [	  gc	  mod	  p	  ||	  ge	  mod	  p	  ||	  VTs	  ||	  VTe	  ||	  DC	  ]PO	  
C	  is	  called	  “token”	  from	  PO	  to	  DC	  for	  data	  collection.	  
The	   token,	   and	   the	  DH	  half	   keys	  gc	  mod	   p	  and	  ge	  mod	   p	   inside,	  will	   be	   valid	   during	   the	   time	  
period	   [VTs,VTe],	   and	  VTs	  must	  be	   later	   than	  T1.	  gc	  mod	  p	   is	  used	   for	  establishing	   shared	  keys	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between	  PO	  and	  MDs.	  ge	  mod	  p,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  for	  DC	  to	  establish	  a	  session	  key	  with	  the	  
MDs.	  Note	  that	  e	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  message	  so	  that	  DC	  can	  retrieve	  it	  using	  K.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
note	   the	   fact	   that	   ge	   mod	   p	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   PO	   assures	   that	   a	   compromised	   DC	   cannot	  
perform	  a	  small	  subgroup	  attack	  on	  the	  MDs’	  DH	  keys.	  
To	  be	  able	  to	  decrypt	  the	  data	  collected	  by	  the	  DCs,	  the	  PO	  has	  to	  remember	  one	  K	  per	  DC,	  but	  
DH	  secret	  c	  can	  be	  the	  same	  for	  all	  DCs.	  Therefore,	  the	  memory	  requirement	  at	  the	  PO	  is	  very	  
low.	  To	   further	   reduce	  the	  state	   information	  kept	  at	   the	  PO,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  close	  the	  session	  
after	   the	  DC	  has	   received	   the	   token,	   and	   resume	   the	   session	  when	   the	  DC	   is	   about	   to	   report	  
data.	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  is	  done	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  protocol.	  
B. DC-­‐MD	  Session	  
The	  DC-­‐MD	  session	  happens	  when	   the	  DC	   is	   able	   to	  communicate	   to	   one	   of	   the	  MDs,	   and	   its	  
purpose	  is	   the	  actual	  data	  collection.	  It	  contains	  two	  messages	  between	  the	  DC	  and	  every	  MD,	  
and	  one	  message	  from	  the	  DC	  to	  the	  PO.	  
(4)	   DC	  to	  MD:	  {	  C,	  T	  2	  }MD	  	  where	  C	   =	   [	  g
c	  mod	   p	  ||	  ge	  mod	   p	  ||	  V	  Ts	  	  ||	  V	  Te	  	  ||	  DC	  ]PO	  
T2	   is	   the	   current	   timestamp	  of	   the	  DC,	   and	  C	   is	   the	   token	  received	   in	   Step	   (3).	  When	   the	  MD	  
receives	   the	   message,	   it	   verifies	   it	   by	   checking	   whether	   T2	   is	   close	   to	   its	   current	   time	   and	  
whether	   T2	   falls	   in	   the	   range	   [	  V	  Ts	  ,V	  Te	  ].	  	  T2	  should	  be	  also	  later	  than	  the	  previous	  timestamp	  
used	  for	  the	  same	  purpose.	  The	  MD	  then	  generates	  its	  reply.	  
(5)	   MD	  to	  DC:	  [{	  gd	  mod	   p	  }PO	  ||	  T	  2	  ]MD	  ,	  	  CIPHER-­‐DATA,	  keyed	  hash	  
Let	   DATA	   be	   the	   data	   measured	   by	   the	   MD	   in	   plaintext,	   i.e.,	   the	   data	   to	   be	   collected.	   As	  
mentioned	   earlier,	   we	  want	   to	   encrypt	   DATA	  in	   a	   way	   that	   only	   the	   PO	   can	  read	   it,	   but	  at	  
the	  same	  time,	  we	  want	  to	  allow	  DC	  to	   check	   the	   integrity	   of	   DATA,	  so	   it	   can	   detect	   if	   an	  
attacker	   between	   MD	   and	   DC	   tampers	   with	   the	   data.	   We	   achieve	   this	   by	   establishing	   one	  
session	  key	  between	  the	  PO	   and	   the	   MD,	   and	   one	   session	   key	   between	   the	   DC	  and	   the	  MD.	  
Both	   keys	   are	   established	   through	   DH,	   and	  to	   reduce	   complexity,	   the	   MD	   uses	   the	   same	   DH	  
public	  key	  (gd	  mod	   p)	   for	  both	  keys.	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Given	   d	   (MD’s	   DH	   private	   key),	   the	  MD	   can	   derive	   the	   session	   key	   K1	   shared	   with	   the	   PO	  
based	   on	   gcd	  mod	   p	  and	  based	  on	  T2.	  By	  using	  T2	  to	  establish	  K1,	  even	  if	  the	  DH	  half	  keys	  are	  
reused	  to	  save	  computation,	  K1	  will	  be	  different	  in	  every	  DC-­‐MD	  session.	  The	  MD	  can	  then	  use	  a	  
standard	  mechanism	  to	  develop	  the	  encryption	  key	  and	  the	  integrity	  key	  from	  K1,	  e.g.,	  using	  a	  
hash	  function	  to	  hash	  K1	  with	  other	  information	  as	  done	  in	  IPSec.	  Similarly,	  the	  MD	  obtains	  K2	  
based	  on	  ged	  mod	   p	  and	  T2.	  
The	  MD	   then	   uses	   the	   keys	   derived	   from	  K1	   to	   encrypt	  and	  to	  authenticate	  DATA	   towards	  the	  
PO;	  the	  result	  is	  denoted	  by	  CIPHER-­‐DATA.	  Observe	  that	  CIPHER-­‐DATA	   is	  piggybacked	  in	  the	  same	  
message	  as	   the	  DH	  public	  key	  used	   to	   generate	   the	   session	   key	   K1.	   As	   we	   show	   later,	  this	   is	  
important	   for	   security.	   Finally,	   the	  MD	  uses	  K2	  as	  a	   key	   to	   generate	   a	   keyed	   hash	   of	   CIPHER-­‐
DATA.	  
Upon	  receiving	  the	  message	  from	  the	  MD,	  the	  DC	  verifies	  T2	  from	  the	  signed	  message.	  DC	  can	  
then	   compute	  K2	   using	  gd	  mod	  p	   and	  T2,	   and	   can	  verify	   the	   integrity	  of	  CIPHER-­‐	  DATA.	   If	   the	  
integrity	   check	   is	   successful,	   DC	   encrypts	   CIPHER-­‐DATA	   and	   T2	   using	   the	   session	   key	   K	   it	  
established	  with	   the	  PO	   in	   the	  PO-­‐DC	  session,	  and	  sends	   it	   to	   the	  PO.	  The	  PO	   uses	   gd	  mod	   p	  
and	  T2	   to	   compute	  K1	  and	   the	  encryption	  and	  integrity	  keys	  needed	  to	  decrypt	  and	  to	  validate	  
CIPHER-­‐	  DATA.	  The	  data	  collection	  process	  is	  complete	  once	  the	  PO	  receives	  and	  validates	  DATA.	  
	  6.4	  Security	  and	  Complexity	  Analysis	  
• Protocol	  Complexity:	  
We	   study	   the	   number	   of	   expensive	   operations	   the	   MD	   has	   to	   perform	   every	   time	   data	   are	  
collected.	  In	  practice,	  both	  public	  key	  operations	  and	  DH	  operations	  are	  regarded	  as	  expensive,	  
while	  shared	  key	  operations	  and	  hash	  operations	  are	  not.	  Upon	  receiving	  Message	  4	   in	  Figure	  
6.1,	  MD	  has	  to	  perform	  a	  public	  key	  decryption	  to	  retrieve	  C	  and	  T2.	  To	  verify	  it	  is	  PO	  who	  has	  
signed	   C,	   a	   signature	   verification	   operation	   is	   needed.	   Three	   DH	   operations	   are	   needed	   to	  
generate	  gd	  mod	  p,	  gcd	  mod	  p,	  and	  ged	  mod	  p.	  Finally,	  a	  signature	  operation	  is	  needed	  to	  sign	  gd	  




It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  DH	  operations	  become	  unnecessary	  if	  we	  reuse	  the	  DH	  keys.	  Suppose	  
after	  the	  first	  data	  collection,	  MD	  keeps	  gd	  mod	  p,	  gcd	  mod	  p,	  and	  ged	  mod	  p	   in	  its	  memory.	  PO	  
also	  keeps	  c	  and	  e.	  In	  the	  next	  collection,	  PO	  can	  send	  [	  “REUSE	  DH	  ”||	  VTs	  ||	  VTe	  ||	  DC	  ]PO	  	  as	  a	  
token	  to	  DC.	  When	  MD	  receives	  the	  token,	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  generate	  a	  new	  d	  or	  recompute	  
gcd	  mod	  p	  and	  ged	  mod	  p.	  Note	  that	  because	  T2	   in	  the	  new	  session	  must	  be	  different	  from	  the	  
last	  one,	  K1	  and	  K2	  will	  be	  different	  from	  the	  last	  session	  even	  though	  the	  DH	  keys	  are	  the	  same.	  
In	   principle,	   reusing	   c	   several	   times	   could	   make	   it	   easier	   for	   an	   attacker	   to	   guess	   c.	   In	   the	  
following,	  we	  show	  that	  for	  SELINDA	  this	  is	  not	  true.	  
	  
• Security	  Analysis:	  	  
In	  SELINDA,	  a	  DC	  checks	  whether	  the	  value	  of	  received	  T1	  is	  greater	  than	  previous	  stored	  T1.	  In	  
addition,	  upon	  receiving	  message	  4,	  MD	  checks	  whether	   the	  received	  T2	  value	   is	  greater	   than	  
previously	  stored	  T2	  and	  whether	  VTs	  <	  T2	  <	  VTe.	  Thus	  a	  replay	  attack	  cannot	  be	  possible.	  	  	  
In	  the	  protocol,	  DC	  checks	  the	  integrity	  of	  data	  and	   it	   can	   detect	   if	   an	  attacker	  between	  MD	  
and	  DC	  tampers	  with	  the	  data.	  To	  achieve	  this	  a	  shared	  session	  key	   is	  established	  between	  the	  
DC	   and	   the	   MD.	  Besides,	  a	  keyed-­‐hash	  of	  CIPHER-­‐DATA	  is	  attached	  in	  message	  5.	  By	  verifying	  
the	  hash	  DC	  ensures	  that	  the	  data	  is	  not	  tampered.	  	  
To	  reduce	  the	  memory	  needed	  to	  maintain	  key	  information,	  the	  PO	  uses	  the	  same	  DH	  public	  key	  
to	  develop	  different	  shared	  keys	  with	  different	  MDs.	  This	  approach	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  small	  
subgroup	   attack,	   i.e.,	   an	   attack	   in	  which	   several	   compromised	  MDs	   try	   to	   guess	   the	   PO’s	   DH	  
secret	   key.	   However,	   it	   does	   not	   make	   the	   protocol	   subject	   to	   simultaneous	   small	   subgroup	  
attacks	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  MDs	  have	  to	  piggyback	  data	  with	  their	  public	  keys	  in	  Message	  5.	  
Detail	  security	  analysis	  is	  provided	  in	  [1].	  
SELINDA	  protocol	  also	  protects	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  data	  sent	  in	  earlier	  sessions	  even	  if	  the	  
attacker	  obtains	  the	  long-­‐term	  secrets	  later.	  The	  Diffie-­‐Hellman	  (DH)	  mechanism	  is	  adopted	  for	  





To	  further	  understand	  the	  computational	  performance	  of	  the	  SELINDA	  protocol,	  we	  measure	  the	  time	  
needed	  for	  DC	  to	  collect	  data	  from	  MD.	  The	  MD	  and	  DC	  are	  simulated	  using	  two	  laptops	  with	  Intel	  Core	  
i5	   2.4GHz	   processor	   and	   4GB	   read-­‐only	   memory.	   Figure	   6.2	   shows	   the	   experimental	   setup.	   The	  
prototype	  is	  implemented	  in	  Java.	  The	  laptops	  communicate	  through	  a	  Wi-­‐Fi	  802.11n	  wireless	  network.	  
We	  use	  RSA	  with	  key	  length	  2048	  bits	  as	  the	  public-­‐key	  cryptography	  and	  AES	  with	  key	  length	  256	  bits	  
for	   symmetric	   key	   cryptography.	   We	   use	   SHA-­‐256	   to	   compute	   hash-­‐based	   message	   authentication	  
(HMAC),	  and	  use	  Diffie-­‐	  Hellman	  with	  a	  prime	  order	  of	  length	  1024	  bits.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6.2:	  Experimental	  Setup	  to	  Measure	  the	  Performance	  of	  SELINDA	  Protocol	  
	  6.6	  Evaluation	  
To	   understand	   the	   computational	   complexity	   on	   the	   MDs,	   we	   have	   measured	   the	   time	   needed	   to	  
decrypt	   Message	   4	   and	   create	   Message	   5	   (c.f.,	   Figure	   6.1).	   We	   have	   also	   measured	   the	   total	   time	  
needed	  for	  the	  DC	  to	  collect	  data	  from	  a	  MD	  in	  the	  DC-­‐MD	  session,	  which	  includes	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  
create	  Message	  4,	   the	  round-­‐trip	  network	  delay	  to	  send	  and	  receive	  Messages	  4	  and	  5,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
time	   required	   to	   verify	   the	   integrity	   of	   CIPHER-­‐DATA.	   Figure	  6.3	   shows	   the	  measurement	   results	   as	   a	  
function	  of	  the	  size	  of	  DATA.	  Each	  data	  point	  is	  the	  average	  time	  of	  30	  different	  trials.	  We	  run	  the	  trials	  
at	  different	  times	  of	  the	  day	  to	  get	  a	  more	  accurate	  result,	  since	  the	  network	  delay	  varies	  from	  time	  to	  
time.	  For	  each	  data	  size,	  10	  trials	  are	  run	  at	  morning	  (medium	  network	  delay),	  10	  trials	  are	  run	  at	  mid-­‐
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day	   (peak	   network	   delay)	   and	   10	   trials	   are	   run	   at	   late	   night	   (low	   network	   delay).	   We	   show	   the	   95	  
percent	  confidence	  intervals.	  	  
For	  MD,	  the	  difference	  in	  computational	  time	  between	  data	  sizes	  of	  1	  byte	  and	  4096	  bytes	  is	  less	  than	  
60ms,	  and	   the	  difference	  between	  1K	  and	  4K	   is	   less	   than	  1ms.	  We	  can	  conclude	   that	  our	  mechanism	  
scales	  well	  for	  typical	  amounts	  of	  data	  to	  be	  reported	  in	  the	  considered	  smart	  grid	  context.	  The	  average	  




Figure	  6.3:	  Time	  Performance:	  total	  time	  of	  computation	  in	  MD	  and	  total	  time	  for	  data	  collection	  for	  
messages	  of	  different	  sizes	  
	  
These	   results	   help	   to	   explore	   feasible	   mobility	   patterns	   for	   a	   mobile	   DC	   in	   a	   scenario	   where	   an	  
automobile	  is	  used	  as	  a	  DC.	  An	  automobile	  moving	  at	  50km/h	  can	  advance	  less	  than	  20m	  in	  this	  amount	  
of	   time.	   Since	   the	   communication	   range	   of	   802.11	   is	   around	   250m,	   even	   a	   mobile	   DC	   should	   have	  
enough	  time	  to	  complete	  the	  data	  collection	  process	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  not	  very	  far	  from	  the	  MD.	  We	  thus	  
conclude	  that	  the	  proposed	  SELINDA	  protocol	  fulfills	  the	  goal	  of	  being	  scalable	  and	  efficient.	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CHAPTER	  7	  	  
CONCLUSION	  
	  7.1	  Thesis	  Achievement	  
In	   this	   thesis,	   we	   highlight	   one	   of	   the	   realistic	   authentication	   problems	   in	   the	   smart	   grid	   critical	  
infrastructure.	   We	   propose	   a	   secure	   authentication	   and	   data	   transmission	   protocol	   for	   collecting	  
telemetric	  data	  from	  the	  pole	  devices.	  Our	  password-­‐changing	  framework,	  SCAPACH,	  creates	  short-­‐lived	  
passwords	   and	   shared	   keys	   based	   on	   physical	   characteristics	   (such	   as	   per-­‐pole	   device	   locality,	   data	  
collection	   timestamp	   and	   per-­‐driver	   identification)	   and	   changeable	   secrets,	   and	   ensures	   secure	   data	  
collection	   considering	   the	   resource	   limitations	   of	   the	  measurement	   devices.	   The	   protocol	   is	   fast	   and	  
secured	  against	  different	  security	  attacks	  in	  this	  domain.	  
In	   this	   thesis,	  we	   additionally	   discuss	   a	   secure,	   scalable,	   and	   lightweight	   protocol	   for	   smart	   grid	   data	  
collection.	  This	  protocol	  allows	  a	  measurement	  device	  to	  report	  data	  securely	  to	  the	  power	  operator	  via	  
a	   data	   collector	   that	  may	   not	   be	   trustworthy.	   It	   is	   thus	   suitable	   for	   data	   collection	  using	  mobile	  data	  
collectors,	   and	   can	  be	  used	   for	   community-­‐aided	   data	   collection.	   We	   implemented	   the	   protocol	   and	  
provided	  measurement	   results	   that	   show	   that	   the	   protocol	   indeed	  has	   low	   computational	  complexity	  
and	  makes	  mobile	  smart	  grid	  data	  collection	  possible.	  
	  7.2	  Future	  Work	  	  
A	  lot	  of	  future	  work	  remains	  in	  this	  space	  too.	  First	  of	  all,	  we	  will	  consider	  how	  to	  improve	  the	  scalability	  
and	  efficiency	  of	  the	  SCAPACH	  protocol.	   In	  SCAPACH	  protocol,	  we	  consider	  every	  measurement	  device	  
holds	   a	   secret.	   It	   would	   be	   interesting	   to	   see	   how	  much	   the	   performance	   is	   influenced,	   in	   terms	   of	  
security,	  if	  groups	  of	  measuring	  devices	  share	  a	  secret.	  In	  addition,	  different	  ways	  of	  forming	  the	  groups	  
in	  this	  particular	  scenario	  can	  also	  be	  explored	  and	  compared	  to	  find	  out	  which	  type	  of	  group	  formation	  
gives	  the	  best	  performance.	  	  
Besides,	  we	  have	  not	  considered	  any	  data	  aggregation	  by	  data	  collector	  device	   in	  our	  protocols.	  Data	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aggregation	   can	   be	   included	  with	   our	   framework,	   since	   there	   are	   existing	   applications	  where	   data	   is	  
aggregated	  before	  reporting	  the	  data.	   It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  explore	  if	  efficiency	  can	  be	  improved,	  
while	  keeping	  security	  intact	  when	  introducing	  data	  aggregation.	  
Presently	  we	  run	  our	  experiments	  on	   laptop	  over	  LAN,	  which	   is	  a	  controlled	  environment.	   It	  would	  be	  
interesting	   to	   see	   the	   performance	   metrics	   like	   latency,	   data	   delivery	   time	   when	   our	   framework	   is	  
deployed	  on	  a	  measuring	  device	  and	  run	  the	  communication	  over	  radio	  networks.	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